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HIS Article reviews the Texas law of judgments by default, including judgments nihil dicit. The discussion commences with the initial requirement of obtaining jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, continues chronologically through the reasons for entry of a
judgment by default, and concludes with a discussion of proceedings after
judgment for defendants seeking relief therefrom. This Article expands
and updates a similar article published in 1977.'
I.

DEFINITION AND EFFECT OF A JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT

A judgment by default is one entered against a defendant who, having
been properly served, fails to timely answer. 2 A judgment by default may
also be entered against a defendant, even though he has timely answered,
if his pleadings are stricken by the court as a sanction for hindering pretrial discovery.3 The judgment prevents one party from delaying or impeding the other party in the establishment of his claim.4 It is not intended
to be a procedural device to help the plaintiff obtain a judgment without
experiencing the difficulty that arises from a contest on the merits.5
A judgment nihil dicit 6 serves much the same purpose as a judgment by
default. A court enters a judgment nihil dicit against a defendant who fails
to interpose a defense on the merits after the denial of a dilatory plea,
neglects to oppose a cross-action or counterclaim, or abandons or withdraws his answer. 7 Generally, the judgment is entered against a defendant
who, although having timely answered, fails to appear at the time of trial.8
Since judgment nihil dicit and default judgment cases do not differ materially, 9 they are cited interchangeably throughout this Article.
The consequences of a judgment by default and a judgment nihil dicit
1. Pohl & Kirklin, Judgments by Default-A Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 465

(1977).
2. 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 187, at 324 (1947); see TEX. R. Civ. P. 239.
3. TEX. R. Civ. P. 170, 215a; see infra notes 93-120 and accompanying text.
4. 47 Am. JUR. 2D Judgments § 1152, at 184 (1969).
5. Beck v. Avondino, 50 S.W. 207, 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ); 47 AM. JUR. 2D
Judgments § 1152, at 184 (1969).
6. "Nihil dicit" means literally "he says nothing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 942 (5th

ed. 1979).
7.

Frymire Eng'g Co. v. Grantham, 524 S.W.2d 680, 681 (Tex. 1975) (per curiam);

Graves v. Cameron, Castles & Storey, 77 Tex. 273, 275, 14 S.W. 59, 59 (1890); Wheeler v.
Pope, 5 Tex. 262, 264 (1849); 4 R. MCDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE IN DISTRICT AND
COUNTY COURTS § 17.25, at 26 (F. Elliot rev. ed. 1971).

8. In Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1979), the Texas Supreme Court distinguishes this situation and identified it as a "post-answer default." Id at 682.
9. Id; I H. BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 79, at 108-09 (2d ed.
1902); 3 A.

FREEMAN,

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 1262, at 2623 (E. Tuttle

rev. ed. 1925); 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 187, at 325 (1947); see Hatton v. Gonzalez, 541 S.W.2d
197, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ); Bredeson v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
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are identical; they have the same force and effect as a judgment rendered
after a trial on the merits. 10 A final default judgment is enforceable to the
same extent as any other judgment. I I A default by one defendant, how12
ever, does not affect the status, rights, or liability of a co-defendant.
Moreover, a default judgment is only determinative of those causes of acbased on a
tion properly pled by the plaintiff.' 3 Thus a default judgment
14
petition that does not state a cause of action will not stand.
II.

OBTAINING JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT

Ordinarily courts presume the correctness of a judgment being challenged on appeal; however, no presumption of regularity applies in favor
of the jurisdictional recitations found in a default judgment. 15 A party
therefore must comply strictly with the rules of service of citation and no-6
tice in order to secure a default judgment and sustain it against attack.1
Jurisdiction over the defendant depends upon securing proper service of
citation, and the proof of such service must appear in the record.17 The
court must have jurisdiction before a final default judgment is entered.
Attempts by the plaintiff to cure jurisdictional defects at a hearing on defendant's motion for new trial are without avail.' 8 The following sections
address the requirements for a valid citation and the manner of obtaining
service of citation. These sections include a discussion of defects of which
the practitioner should be wary, since they may prove fatal in a default
situation.
10. Clark v. Compton, 15 Tex. 32, 32-33 (1855); Harris County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 84 v. Hornberger, 601 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list
Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.); Davis v. Spraggins, 449 S.W.2d 80, 82-83 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1969, writ refd n.r.e.); Pegues v. Moss, 140 S.W.2d 461, 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1940, writ dism'd by agr.); Buttrill v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 45 S.W.2d 636, 641 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1931, no writ).
11. Pohl, Judgments by Default, 1982 Hous. B.A. CiV. PRAC. INST. 2-3; see Clark v.
Compton, 15 Tex. 32, 32-33 (1855); Pegues v. Moss, 140 S.W.2d 461, 471 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1940, writ dism'd by agr.).
12. Buttrill v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 45 S.W.2d 636, 640-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1931, no writ).
13. Williamsburg Nursing Home, Inc. v. Paramedics, Inc., 460 S.W.2d 168, 169-70 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1970, no writ); Firence Footwear Co. v. Campbell, 411
S.W.2d 636, 637-38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1967, writ refd n.r.e.); Southern S.S. Co. v.
Schumacher, 154 S.W.2d 283, 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.);
Pegues v. Moss, 140 S.W.2d 461, 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-E! Paso 1940, writ dism'd by agr.);
Hittner, Default Judgments 2-3, in JUDGMENTS III SEMINAR (1975).
14. Fairdale Ltd. v. Sellers, 640 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982,

no writ).
15. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965).
16. Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 683-84 (Tex. 1979); Gerland's Food Fair, Inc.
v. Hare, 611 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
17. Where personal service has been effected on the defendant, the officer's return constitutes proof of service. TEX. R. Civ. P. 107, 239. When a defendant is served under the
long-arm statute, proof of service may be supplied by filing with the court a certificate of
service from the secretary of state. Whitney v. L & L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex.
1973).
18. Prine v. American Hydrocarbons, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
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Methods of Service of Process

PersonalService

Service of process, unless otherwise permitted, must be made by the
sheriff or constable delivering to the defendant, in person, a copy of the
citation with attached pleadings.' 9 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(a)
provides further that the citation may be served by certified or registered
mail, addressed to the defendant from the sheriff, constable, or district
clerk, with delivery restricted to the addressee only.20 The citation need
not be served by the constable or sheriff in the county where the suit is
filed, but may be served wherever the party is found in the State of
Texas. 2' The officer is required to execute and return the process to the
issuing court without delay 22 and is required by the citation to return it
23
unserved if service cannot be had within ninety days after its issuance.
In the instance of personal service by an officer, the citation and the officer's return must be on file with the court for at least ten days, exclusive
of the day of filing and the day of judgment, before a default judgment can
24
be granted.
Pursuant to rule 106(b), courts may permit persons other than the aforementioned county officials to serve process in certain circumstances. 25 If a
citation cannot be served, the return must show the officer's diligent attempt to serve it,26 but substitute service of citation cannot issue upon the
conclusory statement of an officer that service was "difficult or impractical. ' ' 27 Rather, one must tender the sworn testimony of, or attach an affidavit by, the officer setting forth the time, date, and location of all attempts
28
at service.
2

Alternate Methods of Service
a.

Service on Nonresident Defendant. Article 2031b delineates proce-

dures to follow for service of citation upon an individual or corporation
19. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106. When personal service is impractical, the court, upon motion,
may authorize some form of alternate service to be done in a manner reasonable and effective to give the defendant fair notice of the suit. Id
20. Id 106(a).
21. Id 102, 103.
22. Id 105. Process issued and served before the filing of a petition is not valid. Moorhead v. Transportation Bank, 62 S.W.2d 184, 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1933, no writ).

For the effect of the service of process on Sundays or legal holidays, see 53 TEX. JUR. 2D
Sundays and Holidays § 22, at 554 (1964).

23. TEx. R. Civ. P. 101. Service of citation more than 90 days after its issuance is void.
Lemothe v. Cimbalista, 236 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1951, writ ref'd).
24. TEx. R. Civ. P. 107, 239; Gentry v. Gentry, 550 S.W.2d 167, 167 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1977, no writ).

25. TEX R. Civ. P. 106(b).
26. Id

107.

27. Stylemark Constr., Inc. v. Spies, 612 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
28. Mackie Constr. Co. v. Carpet Servs., Inc., 645 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1982, no writ).
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not a resident of the State of Texas. 29 A nonresident doing business in
Texas is deemed to have appointed the secretary of state as his agent for
service of process if he either does not have an agent in the state, or has an
agent upon whom service has been unsuccessfully attempted. 30 Allegations in the petition must closely follow the requirements of article 203 lb.
Failure to do so with sufficient particularity will cause the court to set aside
an otherwise valid default judgment. 3' The case of Gourmet, Inc. v. Hurley 32 illustrates this requirement. In that instance the plaintiff made service upon the secretary of state under the method provided in article 2031 b,
but the petition did not allege facts authorizing such substituted service.
Specifically, the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant had no registered agent for service in Texas and did not maintain a regular place of
business in the state.3 3 Therefore, service was ineffective even though an
amended petition was filed before a default judgment was taken and sufficient evidence was offered
at an evidentiary hearing to establish the neces34
sary jurisdictional facts.
In Verges v. Lomas & Nettleton FinancialCorp.35 the plaintiff obtained
service of process under the Texas long-arm statute. Plaintiffs original
petition alleged only the defendant's last known address. The secretary of
state's certificate of service was filed of record bearing the notation "unclaimed." The court held that this service was defective and emphasized
the necessity of strict compliance with the long-arm statute. 36 In this case
last known address was not the equivalent of "home address" within the
meaning of article 2031b, section 5.37 Because the plaintiff had failed to
comply strictly with the procedure prescribed by article 203 1 b, the court
concluded that the trial court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. Accordingly, the default judgment against the defendant was
38
reversed.
Prior to the submission of a default judgment, a plaintiff must give proof
of service upon the secretary of state and forwarding of process by the
secretary to the defaulting defendant. 39 A certificate affirming these facts
may be obtained from the secretary of state. 40 As a practical matter, counsel should be certain that standard office procedure includes securing a
29. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § I (Vernon 1964).

30. Id
31. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965); Cars & Concepts, Inc. v. Funston, 601 S.W.2d 801, 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Prine v.
American Hydrocarbons, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

552 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
Id at 511.
Id
642 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
Id. at 823.
Id. at 822.
Id at 823.

39. Whitney v. L & L Realty, Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1973); Verges v. Lomas &

Nettleton Fin. Corp., 642 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Tex. App.-Dallas, 1982, no writ).
40. Id; Vanguard nvs. v. Fireplaceman, Inc., 641 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Tex. App.-Hous-

ton [14th Dist.] 1982, writ retd n.r.e.).
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certificate for each such service and filing it with the court prior to or at the
time of the submission of a default judgment. Practitioners should keep in
is jurisdictional and cannot be cured at a later
mind that proof of service
4
post-judgment hearing. '
b. Substituted Service. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106 provides for
substituted service if the plaintiff shows that personal service is impractical. 42 When filing for substituted service, the plaintiff should request a
particular mode of service, such as delivery to someone over the age of
sixteen at the defendant's residence, or delivery of a copy to the defendmust be made by
ant's place of business. The substituted service, however,
43
that method most likely to reach the defendant.
In addition, the record must affirmatively show compliance with rule
106. 44 In a recent case in which compliance with rule 106 was at issue, the
plaintiff filed for substituted service under rule 106, and the court ordered
such service to be had at the defendant's place of business by delivering
the petition and citation to anyone over sixteen years of age. 45 The substituted service was disallowed on appeal because neither the trial court's
where
order nor the constable's return stated that the business address
46
service was made was the defendant's usual place of business.
The procedure for filing for substituted service varies from court to court
and county to county, but most courts now require a detailed affidavit by
the serving officer stating the various times, dates, and places where he
tried but was unable to effectuate personal service. In large counties procedures vary to the extent that some courts will approve substituted service
under rule 106 based solely on affidavit testimony. Other courts require
the officer to appear in open court and testify to the various service attempts. The latter is very often impractical, and personal appearance by
the serving officer should not be required except in extraordinary circumstances. If evidence of attempted service is taken, that evidence should be
recorded by a court reporter in order to provide the defendant an opportu47
nity to challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence.
41. Prine v. American Hydrocarbons, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Aus-

ton 1975, no writ). InPrine the court stated: "If the trial court did not have jurisdiction over
the person of [the defendant] at the time of the entry of the default judgment, jurisdiction
could not then be created upon the basis of proof of service that was introduced after the
entry of judgment being attacked." Id

But see 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 1174, at 198

(1969).
42. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106. As a prerequisite the rule requires an affadavit stating the
specific facts of the attempt at original service and that original service was unsuccessful. Id
43. Light v. Verrips, 580 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1979, no
writ).
44. Devine v. Duree, 616 S.W.2d 493, 440 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ

granted) (subsequently remanded to trial court, 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 88 (1981)).
45. Hurd v. D.E. Goldsmith Chem. Metal Corp., 600 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ).
46. Id.
47. Pohl, supra note 11, at 11.
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c. Service by Publication. Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 114 through
116 address service of citation by publication. 48 A judgment based on
service by publication is not technically a default judgment in light of rule
244, which requires the court to appoint an attorney to file an answer on
behalf of the nonanswering defendant.4 9 This attorney must appear in
court for the absent defendant, and the proceedings should be transcribed.
The appointed attorney should inquire about the plaintiffs due diligence
in locating the defendant. Additionally, the court-appointed attorney
should make a good faith effort to locate the defendant himself by calling
the defendant's relatives or referring to the telephone directory.
d Service of Process on a Corporation. Every Texas corporation must
have, and continuously maintain, a registered office and a registered agent
within the state.50 Additionally, the Business Corporation Act sets forth
specific requirements concerning any change of registered office or registered agent.51 Likewise, service of process upon a corporation is governed
by statute.5 2 Section 2.11 of the Texas Business Corporation Act states, in
part, that the president, all vice presidents, and the registered agent shall
Service upon other
be agents for service of process upon the corporation.
53
suffice.
not
will
corporation
a
of
employees
Whenever the corporation fails to appoint or maintain a registered agent
in Texas, or if an exercise of reasonable diligence fails to locate the registered agent at the regular office, the secretary of state shall be the agent for
service.5 4 If the secretary of state is served with any such process, he must
send one of the copies served upon him to the corporation at its regular
office by certified mail with return receipt requested.5 5 Once the citation is
mailed to the appropriate address, the office of the secretary of state will
issue, upon request and after payment of a fee, a certificate stating the
service secured by that office. 5 6 This certificate should be filed with the
papers of the cause and should be on file at the time a default judgment is
submitted.
e. PracticalConsiderationsofAlternate Service. Proof of alternate service is often dependent upon the return receipt of certified mail. The sufficiency of service by mail may depend upon the notation placed upon a
returned envelope by the United States Postal Service. The case of TXXN,
48. TEX. R. Crv. P. 114-116.
49. Id 244.

50. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.09 (Vernon 1980). The registered office may be,
but need not be, the same as the corporation's place of business. Id
51. Id arts. 2.10, 2.10-1.
52. Id. art. 2.11.
53. Ponca Wholesale Mercantile Co. v. Alley, 378 S.W.2d 129, 132-33 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
54. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.11(B) (Vernon 1980).

55. Id
56. Labor Force, Inc. v. Hunter, Farris & Co., 601 S.W.2d 146, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
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Inc. v. D/FWSteel Co. 57 discusses this subject. The certified letter sent by

the secretary of state was returned with the notation "Not Deliverable as
Addressed, Unable to Forward. 5' 8 On appeal the defendant contended
that its right to due process of law was violated by the plaintiff's failure to
attempt service of process upon defendant at an address where the plaintiff
allegedly knew the defendant could be found. Because such information
was not introduced at any proceeding in the trial court, the appellate court
would not consider it on appeal. Since the certificate of the secretary of
state reflected that a copy of the citation was forwarded by registered mail
to the address of the defendant's registered office, the service was held to
be sufficient. 59 The court stated: "The failure of the method of service in
this case was the result of appellant's own failure to comply with the statutory requirements which were designed to assure it '60
of notice of pending
'
suits, not of any failure on the part of the appellee.
The question arises as to the sufficiency of service if the registered notice
is returned with the notation, "Insufficient Address." In such a case, a default judgment should probably not be granted as it appears that no such
address can be located by the postal service. Should the notice, however,
be returned as "Refused" or "Unclaimed," then a default should be
granted. In the first example, and in the example stated in TXXN, Inc., the
address itself is insufficient. In the second two situations the notations
should be interpreted by the courts to mean that, while the defendant may
be avoiding his mail, the address is accurate.
B. Defects in the Citation
A judgment may be entered only against a defendant who has been duly
served. 61 Even though the method of service may not be defective, the
citation itself may contain flaws that prevent the defendant from receiving
notice. The courts have established strict rules for testing the validity of
citations to insure that a defendant receives proper notice of any proceedings commenced against him. 62 Historically, when setting aside default
judgments Texas courts have strictly examined errors in citation.63 In
57. 632 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).

58. Id. at 708.

59. Id.
60. Id at 709.
61.

TEX. R. Civ. P. 124.

62. 1 H. BLACK, supra note 9, § 324; see Diamond Chem. Co. v. Sonoco Prods. Co., 437
S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, no writ).
63. See Durham v. Betterton, 79 Tex. 223, 14 S.W. 1060 (1891) (citation must contain
file number of suit); Sloan v. Battle, 46 Tex. 215 (1876) (return by sheriff must state day
when executed); Covington v. Burleson, 28 Tex. 368, 371 (1866) (citation must state correct
time and place of court at which defendant is summoned to appear); Foster v. Christensen,
67 S.W.2d 246, 253 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1934, holding approved) (citation must correctly
state date of court's next term and direct defendant to appear at that time); Stafford Constr.
Co. v. Martin, 531 S.W.2d 667, 668-69 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ) (citation
must be directed to defendant and not agent); Brown-McKee, Inc. v. J.F. Bryan & Assocs.,
522 S.W.2d 958, 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ) (invalid service when defendant named in citation was corporation and sheriffs return was ambiguous as to identity
of corporation); Scucchi v. Woodruff, 503 S.W.2d 356, 35 8-59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
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Curry Motor Freight, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co. 64 the serving officer's return of citation stated that service was accomplished by serving the vice
president. The court of civil appeals held that the return of service was
fatally defective in that merely stating the identity of the person served did
not sufficiently state the manner of such service. 65 Service upon an agent
continues to be a troublesome area in Texas law. In HL. McRae Co. v.
Hooker Construction Co. 66 the court held that service of Process on the
defendant's attorney, absent the defendant's authorization of the attorney
as his agent for service, did not properly invoke the trial court's jurisdicalso been set aside for failure to state the
tion. 67 Default judgments have
68
defendant's name correctly.

If an attorney has appeared in a case on behalf of a defendant, then the
defendant may be deemed to have waived any objections to the method by
which jurisdiction was obtained over his person. The initial motion challenging defects in service of citation is a motion to quash the service. Once
a motion to quash is entered, however, problems in the service of process
1973, no writ) (person who serves notice must swear that he is disinterested person); Nail v.
Gene Biddle Feed Co., 347 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1961, no writ)
(citation must be directed to defendant and command defendant to answer); Hance v. Cogswell, 307 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1957, no writ) (citation must disclose petition
filing date, file number, and date of issuance); George v. Elledge, 261 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1953, no writ) (citation defective if it recites impossible filing date for
plaintiff's petition); Harmon & Reed v. Quinn, 258 S.W.2d 441, 442-43 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1953, no writ) (petition must contain sufficient allegations that person named in
citation would be proper agent); Woodall v. Lansford, 254 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1953, no writ) (return must state that certified copies of writ and plaintiff's petition have been delivered to defendant); State v. Davis, 139 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1940, writ dism'd judgmt cor.) (if husband and wife named as defendants,
return must show both have received copy of notice); Heard v. J & C Drilling Co., 124
S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1939, no writ) (default judgment void if described date on citation is impossible); Turner v. Ephraim, 28 S.W.2d 608, 609 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1930, no writ) (default judgment invalid if defendant served by person without authority); Beck v. Nelson, 17 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1929, no writ)
(default judgment invalid if citation mistates file number); Holcomb & Hoke Mfg. Co. v.
Amason, 2 S.W.2d 360, 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1927, no writ) (return must show
that true copy of citation, along with certified copy of petition, was delivered to defendant's
agent); Fitzpatrick v. Dorris Bros., 284 S.W. 303 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1926, no writ) (if
more than one named defendant, return must show copy of notice delivered to each); Holland v. Wood, 196 S.W. 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1917, no writ) (default judgment
invalid if return shows defendant not served with citation); Friend v. Thomas, 187 S.W. 986,
987 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1916, no writ) (return showing execution on impossible
date will not support default judgment); Crenshaw v. Hempell, 130 S.W. 731, 732-33 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1910, no writ) (citation must include file number of suit and where court will be
held); Duke v. Spiller, 11 S.W. 787 (Tex Civ. App. 1908, no writ) (return must show date of
service and that each defendant was served with copy); Robinson v. Horton, 81 S.W. 1044
(Tex. Civ. App. 1904, no writ) (both date of service and clerk's seal required on citation);
Douthit v. Martin, 39 S.W. 944, 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ) (default judgment invalid
if defendant served by sheriff without authority to do so).
64. 565 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
65. Id at 106.
66. 579 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, no writ).
67. Id. at 64.
68. Brown-McKee, Inc. v. J.F. Bryan & Assocs., 522 S.W.2d 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Texarkana 1975, no writ).
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may be moot.69 The only real value of a motion to quash the citation may
be to obtain some additional time in which to answer. Care should also be
taken with post-judgment appearances. An appearance during pursuit of
an appeal has been considered binding not only in the court of civil appeals but also for any further proceedings in the trial court. 70 In such a
situation questions concerning the service of citation and the return thereof
are no longer in issue.
An attorney must be careful not to make admissions of service when
attempting to set aside a default judgment. The case of Hurst v. A.RA.
Manufacturing Co.71 concerned a defendant's attack on a default judgment
entered against him by the trial court. The appellate court stated that the
defendant's contention that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his person could not stand because the defendant had admitted in his appellate
72
brief that he was duly served and yet filed no answer.

III.
A.

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Stating a Cause ofAction

To determine whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action, the
pleadings must enable the court to ascertain the elements of the cause of
action and the relief sought. 7 3 The petition need not plead the evidence
upon which the plaintiff relies to establish his cause of action in order to
support a default judgment. The pertinent facts, however, must be ascertainable by reference to the petition. 74 Therefore, the petition is not suffli69. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 122. A special appearance is not the proper way to challenge
defects or errors in obtaining jurisdiction over the person or property of the defendant.
Goldman v. Pre-Fab Transit Co., 520 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, no writ); 8 R. STAYTON, TEXAS FORMS § 4716 comment at 71 (Supp. 1977);
Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction;Article 2031b, The Texas "Long Arm" JurisdictionStatute;
and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdictionin Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEX. L. REV. 279,
313 (1964). But see Gathers v. Walpace Co., 544 S.W.2d 169, 170-71 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1976, writ refd n.r.e.); Castle v. Berg, 414 S.W.2d 523, 526 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1967, no writ). When a party makes a special appearance under rule 120a, all objections to jurisdiction, including method of service, are waived if the party is amenable to
process issued by the courts of this state. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a(3). Having specially appeared, the only jurisdictional issue that a defendant may assert on appeal is his amenability
to service of process. This is not a harsh result. By utilizing the special appearance procedure a party quite properly admits that he has notice of the suit and appropriately confines
his attack to the jurisdiction of the court over his person or property. This is a small price to
pay for the privilege of specially appearing for the purpose of fully litigating the fundamental question of minimal contacts at the rule 120a hearing and upon appeal.
70. Mega v. Anglo Iron & Metal Co., 601 S.W.2d 501, 505 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1980, no writ); Hanover Modular Homes of Taft, Inc. v. Corpus Christi Bank &
Trust, 476 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972, no writ).
71. 555 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
72. Id at 142.
73. Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 679 (Tex. 1979). Use of conclusory phrases in
the pleadings, such as the word "negligence," have been deemed insufficient to support a
default judgment. Lopez v. Abalos, 484 S.W.2d 613, 614-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1972, no writ); Ramfield v. Wilburn, 465 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1971, no writ); Stinson v. Jones, 434 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968, no
writ).
74. Roberts v. Roberts, 621 S.W.2d 835, 837-38 (Tex. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
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cient to support a default judgment if it does not factually inform the court
what judgment it is to render upon the default. 7 5 Mere formalities, minor
defects, and technical insufficiencies will not invalidate a default judgment
as long as the
petition states a cause of action and gives fair notice to the
76
opposition.
A defendant who fails to answer must also be notified of every amendment to the pleadings that sets forth a new cause of action or would result
in a more onerous judgment in the event of default. 77 Such notification is
usually given by serving the amended petition or forwarding a copy of the
amended pleading to the attorney representing the defendant. Inclusion of
the phrase "and for such other and further relief to which plaintiff...
may show himself entitled" in the prayer for relief does not enlarge a
pleading so as to include an entirely different cause of action.7 8 The absent
party will not be considered to have defaulted on a cause of action where
fair notice of that cause of action is not contained in the pleadings. Therefore, if an amended petition is filed prior to the defendant's answer, additional service should be secured in order to uphold a default judgment
79
when entered.
B. Failureto Timely Answer
L

Pleas of Privilege

A plea of privilege, to be effective, must be filed by the defendant prior
81
to any other appearance8 ° with the exception of a special appearance.
The attorney must therefore file the plea of privilege before the answer,
and any subsequent answer must be specifically conditioned upon the plea
of privilege. 82 In many instances, the plea of privilege and the answer are
contained in the same pleading. in such cases, the plea of privilege appears as the first part of the pleading and the answer appears thereafter. A
plea of privilege does not serve to contest the entire suit by way of an
answer. If a plea of privilege is overruled and no answer is of record, the
75. Mo-Vac Service, Inc. v. Marine Contractors Supply, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 573, 574-75
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
76. Fairdale Ltd. v. Sellers, 640 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist. 1982,
no writ); Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex. 1979); Naficy v. Braker, 642
S.W.2d 282, 284 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
77. Baten Erection Corp. v. Iron Workers' Pension Trust Fund, 608 S.W.2d 262, 263-64
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.) 1980, no writ).
78. Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Tex. 1979).
79. Weaver v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 570 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1978); Owen
v. Owen, 620 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Baten Erection
Corp. v. Iron Workers' Pension Trust Fund, 608 S.W.2d 262, 263-64 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ).
80. 3 W. DORSANEO, TExAs LITIGATION GUIDE § 70.01[2] (1983); 1 R MCDONALD,
TExAS CIVIL PRACTICE IN DISTRICT AND COUNTY COURTS § 4.42, at 473 (F. Elliott rev. ed.
1981).
81. Thode, supra note 69, at 315-16.
82. 3 W. DORSANEO, supra note 80, § 70.01[2).
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plaintiff may secure a default judgment. In Guaranty Bank v. Thompson 83
the appellant's plea of privilege constituted an appearance in the case for
all purposes once the plea was overruled, and the absence of an answer
84
allowed the default to be taken.
2

SpecialAppearances

The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure do not address the issue of when a
defendant must file his answer after the overruling of a special appearance.
There are three days that could be considerd appearance day: (1) the day
the court renders its decision overruling the special appearance, (2) the day
the court enters its order overruling the special appearance, or (3) the first
Monday after twenty days from either of the preceding dates. No Texas
cases address this issue. In the opinion of the authors, a defendant's answer is due immediately upon the overruling of his special appearance.
This approach finds support in rule 101, which states that a written answer
is due twenty days after service of citation, 85 and in rule 120a, which contains no provision for extending the time within which to answer following
the overruling of a motion challenging jurisdiction. 86 One authority states
that the entry of a special appearance does not affect the necessity of abiding by the time87requirements for filing pleas and motions as established by
rules of court.
C. Interlocutory Judgments
An interlocutory judgment leaves something further to be determined in
disposing of all the parties and their claims.8 8 A final judgment disposes of
all claims, issues, and parties before the court so that no further action by
the court is necessary to settle the entire controversy. 89 In a case involving
multiple defendants a default judgment is not final if an answer is filed by
one or more of the defendants. In such situations a court has great flexibility in setting aside the interlocutory default because the court retains
jurisdiction over the entire matter. Additionally, since only one final judgment may be entered in a case, the entry of a final judgment inconsistent
with a prior interlocutory judgment sets aside the interlocutory judgment.90 For these reasons it is imperative, when an interlocutory default
judgment is secured, that the plaintiffs attorney obtain final entry of the
interlocutory default as soon as possible. The usual method of securing a
final judgment in multi-party cases is to obtain a severance and enter a
83. 619 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981), rev'don other grounds, 632 S.W.2d
338 (Tex. 1982).
84. 619 S.W.2d at 219.
85. TEX. R. Civ. P. 101.

86. Id 120a.
87. 5 AM. JUR. 2oAppearances § 3, at 481 (1962).
88. Kinney v. Tri-State Tel. Co., 222 S.W. 227, 230 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920, judgmt
adopted).
89. Wagner v. Warnasch, 156 Tex. 334, 338, 295 S.W.2d 890, 892 (1956).
90. Ratcliff v. Sherman, 592 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
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final judgment upon the severance, leaving other parties in the same controversy on the active docket of the court. 9 1 Should the plaintiffs attorney
fail to do this, the defendant may be successful in procuring an order setjudgment. Such an order would be interlocutory and
ting aside the default
92
nonappealable.
D.

Default Judgment as a Sanction

Sanctions are most frequently entered by trial courts as a consequence of
a party's abuse of pretrial discovery procedures. The primary purpose of
discovery sanctions is to insure that full disclosure is made during pretrial
93
discovery in order to promote efficient, just, and expeditious litigation.
The sanctions available to curb discovery abuse are stated in Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure 170 and 215a. 94 The harshest sanctions, to which this
Article will be limited, are default judgment and dismissal.
Historically, the purpose of sanctions was not to punish the offending
party, but to secure compliance with discovery rules.95 This limitation on
the invocation of sanctions is no longer valid. 96 A continuing increase in
discovery abuse has necessitated the use of sanctions to deter dilatory and
obstructive tactics. 97 In National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey
Club, Inc. 98 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a district
court's dismissal of a cause of action for the plaintiffs failure to timely
answer interrogatories, and stated:
[T]he most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or
rule must be available to the district court in appropriate cases, not
merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant
such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent. 99
The sanction of striking a party's pleadings, thereby subjecting him to default judgment or dismissal, is a harsh remedy' °° and one that should be
used sparingly.' 0 ' On the other hand, where the imposition of less severe
91. TEX. R. Civ. P. 41; 4 W. DORSANEO, supra note 80, § 112.10[2].
92. Flato Bros. v. McKinney, 399 S.W.2d 957, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1966, no writ).

93. See TEX. R. Civ. P. I (efficient, just, and expeditions litigation are goals expressed

for procedural rules generally); see also Ginther-Davis Constr. Co. v. Texas Commerce
Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. H-80-687, slip op. at 9-10 (S.D. Tex. July 30, 1981) (unreported)
(reasons for discovery sanctions in federal court).
94. Id. 170, 215a.
95. U.S. Leasing Corp. v. O'Neill, Price, Anderson & Fouchard, Inc., 553 S.W.2d I1, 13
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ).
96. McConnico, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure-Effect of Recent Amendments, 1982
Hous. B.A. CIV. PRAC. INST. 19.

97. Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Evans, 590 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[ist Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980).
98. 427 U.S. 639 (1976).
99. Id at 643.
100. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hollingsworth, 156 Tex. 176, 180-81, 293 S.W.2d 639, 642
(1956); Hankins v. Haffa, 469 S.W.2d 733, 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, no writ).
101. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hollingsworth, 156 Tex. 176, 180-81, 293 S.W.2d 639, 642
(1956); Pena v. Williams, 547 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ).
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sanctions is ineffective in enforcing pretrial discovery orders, it is incumbent upon the trial court to impose the harsher sanctions, thereby preventing recalcitrant parties from frustrating justice. 0 2 The recent case of
Waguespack v. Halipoto 103 involved the dismissal of the plaintiffs cause
for failure to comply with rules of discovery. In affirming the lower court's
action, the court of appeals discussed the rules providing for sanctions:
"The Rules provide a trial judge with the tools to facilitate the litigation of
lawsuits and, to a certain extent, to prevent abuse of the legal process. This
discretion is therefore appropriately broad.'1 4 The choice of an appropriate sanction is for the trial court, and the trial court's decision should not
be overturned absent the clear showing of an abuse of discretion. 10 5
Historically, an imbalance existed between the imposition of sanctions
on plaintiffs and the imposition of sanctions on defendants. When a court
finds a plaintiff guilty of discovery abuse, it may strike the plaintiffs pleadings and dismiss his case. 1°6 On the other hand, a defendant guilty of
discovery abuse may suffer a judgment by default. 107 The imbalance exists
when the plaintiffs cause is dismissed without prejudice because no comparable sanction is available to the court to impose against a recalcitrant
defendant.10 Moreover, Texas courts have not been consistent in their acceptance of dismissal with prejudice as a valid sanction for discovery
abuse. Early cases held that dismissal with prejudice was not an appropriate sanction for failure to make discovery.'°9 Notwithstanding increasing
102. Bottinelli v. Robinson, 594 S.W.2d 112, 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1979, no writ); see Bass v. Duffey, 620 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, no writ). If a default judgment is entered by way of sanctions against a recalcitrant defendant, the court's order should include a provision expressly striking the defendant's answer. See Nutting v. National Homes Mfg. Co., 639 S.W.2d 721, 724 (Tex. App.Austin 1982, no writ).
103. 633 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
104. Id. at 629.
105. Bass v. Duffey, 620 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no
writ); Lewis v. Illinois Employers Ins. Co., 590 S.W.2d 119, 119 (Tex. 1979).
106. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168, 170, 215a.
107. Id 167, 168, 170, 215a.
108. A dismissal with prejudice acts as an adjudication of the party's rights, barring the
right to bring or maintain an action on the same claim or cause. Gonzalez v. Mann, 583
S.W.2d 637, 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), rev'don other grounds, 595 S.W.2d
102 (Tex. 1979). A mere dismissal or dismissal without prejudice simply places the party in
the position he was in prior to the court's assuming jurisdiction and does not operate as a bar
to subsequent action. Crofts v. Court of Civil Appeals, 362 S.W.2d 101, 104 (Tex. 1962);
Gonzalez, 583 S.W.2d at 640. If the statute of limitations has run, however, a mere dismissal
or dismissal without prejudice will operate in the same manner as a dismissal with prejudice.
In other words, if the plaintiff elects to refile, the defendant may interpose the affirmative
defense of limitations. TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
109. See Crofts v. Court of Civil Appeals, 362 S.W.2d 101, 104 (Tex. 1962). In Crofis the
court stated: "It is elementary that a dismissal is in no way an adjudication of the rights of
parties; it merely places the parties in the position they were in before the court's jurisdiction
was invoked just as if the suit had never been brought." Id at 104; see also Texhoma Stores,
Inc. v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 398 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler), writ reifdn.r.e. per
curiam, 401 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1966). There the court stated:
[I]f the trial court had any authority to impose the penalty of dismissal "with
prejudice" it must be found in Rule 170. We have carefully examined Rule
170 and fail to find anything therein which would indicate that the trial court
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incidents of discovery abuse, the cases indicate a continued reluctance by
the courts to impose on recalcitrant plaintiffs the harsher sanction of dismissal with prejudice." 0 Two recent cases, however, reflect a trend toward
imposition of this sanction. In Lueg v. Tewell !"' an action for alienation of
affection, the plaintiffs case was dismissed with prejudice for failure to
comply with a discovery order." 2 In affirming, the appellate court stated:
The record supports deductions by the trial court that the appellant
willfully refused to provide any of the documents requested and that
the appellant consistently enlisted dilatory tactics to delay the discovery, and even failed to comply with personal agreements. Under these
circumstances it was not an abuse13of discretion for the trial court to
dismiss the cause with prejudice.
In Bottinelli v. Robinson 114 an action alleging fraud in connection with certain business transactions, the trial court struck the plaintiffs pleadings
and dismissed his cause of action with prejudice for failure to comply with
an order to produce certain documents. In upholding the ruling of the trial
court, the appellate court refused to follow earlier cases holding that a dismissal authorized by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 170(b) means only
dismissal without prejudice." 5 The court stated:
[I]t undermines even-handed fairness under the discovery rules to
hold that a trial court may enter a default judgment against a recalcitrant defendant, thereby finally disposing of his liability defense, yet
may not dismiss with prejudice the action of plaintiff who refuses to
is given authority to dismiss a cause of action "with prejudice." While the rule
does provide that upon failure to obey an order made under Rule 167, the trial
court is authorized to dismiss the action by proceedings, it nowhere provides
that same may be dismissed "with prejudice." Insofar as we have been able to
determine, the sanction here invoked has no basis in either constitutional or
statutory enactment, and we have been unable to find any decisions holding
that a trial judge has such power.
398 S.W.2d at 347.
110. Fultz v. Cummins Sales & Serv., Inc., 587 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus
Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Gonzalez v. Mann, 583 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.]), rev'd on other grounds, 595 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1979).
111. 572 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
112. Id at 104.
113. Id. The court further stated:
The purpose of the sanctions provided in Rule 170 is to secure compliance
with the discovery orders, not to punish an erring party ....
The sanction of
dismissal is a harsh one, and should be imposed only when clearly authorized ....
A party must be given notice and a chance to be heard on any
motion to impose a sanction for failure to produce documents ....
Once
these procedural safeguards are met, the imposition of sanctions for failure to
comply with discovery is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and
the court's action can be set aside only upon a showing of clear abuse of
discretion.
Id. (citations omitted).
114. 594 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, no writ).
115. Id at 116; see Gonzalez v. Mann, 583 S.W.2d 637, 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
14th Dist.]), rev'don other grounds, 595 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1979); Phillips v. Vincent Supply
Co., 581 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ); Texhoma
Stores, Inc. v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 398 S.W.2d 344, 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler), writ
ret'dn.r.e.per curiam, 401 S.W.2d 593 (1966).
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permit discovery,
leaving him to refile the action and avoid the neces16
sary order.'
Since the purpose of the default judgment is to keep dockets current, thereby preventing a procrastinating defendant from impeding
the plaintiff in the establishment of his claim, 17 it seems that the purpose of a dismissal should also be to keep the dockets current, thereby
preventing a procrastinating plaintiff from impeding the judicial process. This purpose can best be served by the dismissal of a disobedient plaintiffs cause with prejudice. To equalize the sanctions of
default judgment and dismissal, consideration should be given to
making dismissal without prejudice unavailable to the trial judge as a
sanction for discovery abuse.
The trial court may vacate its order of sanctions at any time prior to
the loss of jurisdiction."18 In order to set aside a default judgment or
dismissal entered by way of sanctions, the disobedient party should be
required to satisfy the test of Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc. "9
As applied in the context of an order invoking sanctions, the Craddock test provides that the trial court's order should be set aside only
if the recalcitrant party demonstrates that the misconduct resulting in
the sanction was neither intentional nor the result of conscious indifference, but rather was due to a mistake or an accident; that he has a
meritorious claim or defense; and that his motion is filed at a time
when the granting thereof will120occasion no delay or otherwise work an
injury to the opposing party.
E

Proving Damages

If the plaintiffs claim is liquidated and proved by an instrument in writing, damages pursuant to a default judgment will be assessed by the
court.' 2' A liquidated claim is one that "can be accurately calculated by
the court, or under its direction, from the allegations contained in plaintiffs petition and the instrument in writing."' 122 Common examples of
claims which have been held to be liquidated are suits on promissory
116. 594 S.W.2d at 117. As further justification for dismissing the plaintiffs case with
prejudice, the court stated:
Litigants who abuse the discovery procedures and use them to play a delaying
game or to conceal evidence do more than inconvenience or prejudice their
opponents. ... "[1n this era of crowded dockets. . . they also deprive other
litigants of an opportunity to use the courts as a serious dispute-settlement
mechanism."
Id. at 118 (quoting G-K Properties v. Redevelopment Agency, 577 F.2d 645, 647 (9th Cir.
1978)).
117. Hagans & Pohl, Default Judgments, 1980 Hous. B.A. JUDGMENTS INST. 1; Pohl,
supra note 11, at 2; see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
118. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b; 4 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, § 17.03.
119. 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939); see infra text accompanying note 175 for the
elements of the Craddock test.
120. 134 Tex. at 393, 133 S.W.2d at 126.
121. TEX. R. Civ. P. 241; Wallace v. Snyder Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1975, writ retd n.r.e.); Buttrill v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 45 S.W.2d 636,
638-39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1932, no writ).
122. Freeman v. Leasing Assocs., Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1973, no writ); accord Hagans & Pohl, supra note 117, at 14.
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24

bonds,

25

checks, 12 6 and sworn accounts.127 If the in-

strument in writing is attached to the plaintiffs petition and if the amount
of damages can be calculated from the allegation in the petition, judgment
should be entered for that amount against the defaulting defendant. When
damages are liquidated the rules of procedure contemplate that the plaintiff be awarded the damages without the necessity of a hearing or the presentation of evidence.
A default judgment does not establish allegations pertaining to unliquidated damages. 128 Unliquidated claims include damages for personal injuries, lost profits, consequential damages, exemplary damages, and
reasonable attorney's fees. 129 The plaintiff must present evidence of unliquidated damages, 130 and this evidence must be both competent and consistent with the cause of action pleaded.' 3 1 The defendant has the right to
demand a jury trial on the issue of unliquidated damages. 32 The defendant must receive notice of the trial setting and applicable local rules must
be followed in setting the case for trial.' 33 At the trial, the defendant is
entitled to participate fully by cross-examining plaintiffs witnesses and offering evidence in rebuttal for the purpose of reducing damages. 134 A de123. Loungeway v. Hale, 73 Tex. 495, 498, 11 S.W. 537, 538 (1889); Wallace v. Snyder
Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Odom v.
Pinkston, 193 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
124. Freeman v. Leasing Assocs., Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
125. Buttrill v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 45 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1931, no writ) (since damages were liquidated "right to a jury trial did not exist").
126. Farley v. Clark Equip. Co., 484 S.W.2d 142, 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972,
writ rerd n.r.e.).
127. O'Brien v. Cole, 532 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ); Alexander v. Texoma Wholesale Jewelers, 307 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1957, writ ref d n.r.e.); Colorado River Syndicate Subscribers v. Alexander, 288 S.W. 586,
587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1926, no writ); see TEX. R. Civ. P. 185. The requisites of rule
185 are, however, strictly construed. Hassler v. Texas Gypsum Co., 525 S.W.2d 53, 54-55
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ); Big K Furniture Co. v. Covey Co., 511 S.W.2d 329,
330 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
128. TEX. R. Civ. P. 243; Freeman v. Leasing Assocs., Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ); Maywald Trailer Co. v. Perry, 238 S.W.2d
826, 827 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston 1951, writ refd n.r.e.); Southern S.S. Co. v. Schumacher, 154 S.W.2d 283, 284 (.Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston 1941, writ ref d w.o.m.).
129. Hittner, supra note 13, at 5-7; STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS COLLECTION MANUAL

§ 12.09(b) (1980).
130. TEX. R. Civ. P. 243; Johnson v. Gisondi, 627 S.W.2d 448, 449 (Tex. App.-Houston
[ist Dist.] 1981, no writ).
131. Schoenberg v. Forrest, 253 S.W.2d 331, 335-36 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952,
no writ); 3 A. FREEMAN, supra note 9, § 1292, at 2683; 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 1176, at
199 (1969).
132. TEX. R. Civ. P. 241, 243; White Motor Co. v. Loden, 373 S.W.2d 863, 865-66 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, no writ); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Skinner, 128 S.W. 715, 716
(Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref d); see Bumpass v. Morrison, 70 Tex. 756, 759, 8 S.W. 596,
597-98 (1888); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15. Defendant does not have a right to a jury trial if
damages are liquidated. Buttrill v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 454 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1931, no writ).
133. Bass v. Duffey, 620 S.W.2d 847, 849-50 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981,
no writ).
134. Id; Rainwater v. Haddox, 544 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no
writ); 1 H. BLACK, supra note 9, § 91; 4 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, § 17.23.4, at 122; see
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fendant who neglects to appear at the time unliquidated damages are
proven may, however, be deemed to have waived his right to present evidence and cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses. 35
IV.
A.

RIGHTS OF A DEFAULTING DEFENDANT

Stenographic Record of Plaintiffs Evidence

By defaulting, a defendant admits those causes of action properly
pleaded by the plaintiff. 136 As previously discussed, however, he does not
admit allegations of unliquidated damages. 137 If damages are unliquidated, they may not be assessed without proper proof. 38 The sufficiency
of plaintiff's proof is subject to review on motion for new trial or upon
appeal.' 39 Consequently, the defendant is entitled to a stenographic record of the plaintiff's evidence, and the court reporter has the mandatory
duty140 to prepare, upon proper request,'41 a complete statement of facts in
142
question and answer form.
A conflict once existed among Texas appellate courts on the question of
whether a defaulting defendant waived his right to a statement of facts in
question and answer form when he did not endeavor to procure a statement of facts from another source. 143 A number of courts applied a due
Maywald Trailer Co. v. Perry, 238 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1951, writ
refd n.r.e.); St. LouisS.W. Ry. v. Denson, 26 S.W. 265, 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ).
135. See Green v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 422 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. 1968); TEX. R. Civ. P.
220.
136. Edwards Feed Mill, Inc. v. Johnson, 158 Tex. 313, 317, 311 S.W.2d 232, 234 (1958);
Johnson v. Gisondi, 627 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ);
Gourmet, Inc. v. Hurley, 552 S.W.2d 509, 513 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ); Williamsburg Nursing Home, Inc. v. Paramedics, Inc., 460 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ); 4 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, § 17.23.3, at 120.
137. TEX. R. Civ. P. 243; Gaffney v. Cielo Vista Bank, No. 7019, slip op. at 1 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso July 29, 1981, no writ) (unreported); Watson v. Sheppard Fed. Credit Union,
589 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Gourmet, Inc. v.
Hurley, 552 S.W.2d 509, 513 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ); see supra notes 128-35
and accompanying text.
138. Cactus Drilling Co. v. McGinty, 580 S.W.2d 609, 610-11 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1979, no writ); Burrows v. Bowden, 564 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1978, no writ); Otten v. Snowden, 550 S.W.2d 758, 759-60 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1977, no writ); see supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
139. Roe v. Doe, 607 S.W.2d 602, 603 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ); see
Smith v. Smith, 544 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tex. 1976); Robinson v. Robinson, 487 S.W.2d 713,
715 (Tex. 1972); Victory v. Hamilton, 127 Tex. 203, 208, 91 S.W.2d 697, 700 (1936).
140. TEX. R. Civ. P. 376b; Fine v. Page, 572 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1978, writ dism'd); Morgan Express, Inc. v. Elizabeth-Perkins, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 312, 315
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd); see Wolters v. Wright, 623 S.W.2d 301, 305-06
(Tex. 1981).
141. TEX. R. Civ. P. 377; 6 W. DORSANEO, supra note 80, § 143.110[2].
142. Gilbert v. Singleton, 611 S.W.2d 163, 164-65 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ)
(per curiam); see Blue Cross-Blue Shield v. Davidson, 574 S.W.2d 215, 218 (Tex. Civ.
App-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ); Stemco Mfg. Co. v. Louis Delhomme Marine, Inc.,
573 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
143. Figari, Texas Civil Procedure,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 293, 306
(1976).
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diligence test, which required a showing that all alternative sources 44 of a
statement of facts had been exhausted, 45 while other courts held that the
right to a statement of facts in question and answer form could not be
waived.' 46 The Texas Supreme Court resolved this conflict in Smith v.
Smith 147 and Rogers v. Rogers. 48 The rule is now well settled that the
right to a statement of facts in question and answer form may not be
waived by the failure to demonstrate the unavailability of a statement of
facts in an alternate form. 149 Stated differently, one exercises due diligence
by properly requesting preparation of a statement of facts in question and
answer form. 150 Morgan Express, Inc. v. Elizabeth-Perkins,Inc. 15 states
the applicable rule:
[A]n appellant who was not present and was not represented when the
testimony was taken is in no position to agree with his opponent concerning the substance of the testimony, and neither should he be required to rely on the unaided memory of the trial judge, who, though
presumably fair, has already decided the merits of the case against the
appellant. . . . If the reporter's failure to perform this mandatory
duty deprives a party of this right to52 an adequate review, the case
should be remanded for a new trial.'
144. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure recognize question and answer, narrative, abbreviated, and agreed statements of fact. TEX. R. CIv. P. 377, 378.
145. Brown v. Brown, 520 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975,
writ dism'd w.o.j.); Parker v. Sabine Valley Lumber Co., 485 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1972, no writ); Harris v. Lebow, 363 S.W.2d 184, 185 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Johnson v. Brown, 218 S.W.2d 317, 321-22 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1948, writ ref d n.r.e.); Hall v. Kynerd, 97 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1936, writ dism'd).
146. See Woods v. Indiana Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1205 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi Apr. 28, 1977, no writ) (unreported); Hall v. C-F Employees Credit Union,
536 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ); Morgan Express, Inc. v.
Elizabeth-Perkins, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 312, 314-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ refd);
Mitchell v. Hunsaker Mfg., Inc., 520 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ);
Dugie v. Dugie, 511 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ).
147. 544 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1976).
148. 561 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. 1978) (supreme court clarified and explained holding in Smith
v. Smith).
149. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 626 S.W.2d 332, 333 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ); Goodman v. Goodman, 611 S.W.2d 738, 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ); Watson v. Sheppard Fed. Credit Union, 589 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979,
writ ref d n.r.e.); Blue Cross-Blue Shield v. Davidson, 574 S.W.2d 215, 218 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ); Garcia v. Kelly, 565 S.W.2d 112, 113 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ); Hurt v. Ewald, No. 15918, slip op. at 2-4 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio Mar. 22, 1978, no writ) (unreported); Muldoon v. Musgrave, 545
S.W.2d 539, 541-42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
150. Smith v. Sun-Belt Aviation, Ltd., 625 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1981, writ dism'd).
151. 525 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref d).
152. Id at 315 (citations omitted). Article 2324 was amended in 1975 to provide that the
court reporter shall "upon request" attend all sessions of court and take shorthand notes
thereof. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2324 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); see Blue CrossBlue Shield v. Davidson, 574 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no
writ); Hurt v. Ewald, No. 15918, slip op. at 2-3 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio Mar. 22, 1978,
no writ) (unreported); Bledsoe v. Black, 535 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1976, no writ). For a statement of the purpose of this statutory change, see Pohl & Kirklin,
supra note 1, at 482.
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The rule of Morgan Express applies unless a defendant appears when unliquidated damages are proven, neglects to have the proceedings reported,
and fails 53to timely interpose his objection to the absence of a court
reporter. 1
The absence of a stenographic record may be established in a number of
ways. The stipulation of opposing counsel that no stenographic record is
available will suffice. 154 In the absence of a stipulation, the testimony or
affidavit of the court reporter,155 of the judge who heard plaintiffs damage
evidence,1 56 or of counsel who unsuccessfully requested the stenographic
record' 57 will establish the unavailability of a statement of facts in question and answer form. On appeal, proof of a proper request for the preparation of a statement of facts 58 accompanied by the absence of such
statement of facts is normally sufficient for the granting of a new trial. 5 9
153. Bledsoe v. Black, 535 S.W.2d 795, 796-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ);
Phillips v. Phillips, 532 S.W.2d 161, 163 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ); TEX. R.
Civ. P. 377, 378.
154. Goodman v. Goodman, 611 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no
writ) (uncontroverted that no court reporter present when plaintiff proved damages); Blue
Cross-Blue Shield v. Davidson, 574 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1978,
no writ) (appellant requested preparation of statement of facts and obtained stipulation of
opposing counsel that no court reporter was present during trial of case); Burrows v. Bowden, 564 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ) (stipulation by
attorneys for both parties that no evidence offered in support of default judgment); James
Edmond, Inc. v. Schilling, 501 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, no writ) (all
parties admitted in brief that no statement of facts available).
155. Smith v. Smith, 544 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Tex. 1976) (trial court hearing established that
court reporter unable to furnish fact statement); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 626 S.W.2d 332, 333
(Tex. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ) (appellant submitted affidavit of court reporter that no trial
record made from which to prepare statement of facts); Gaffney v. Cielo Vista Bank, No.
7019, slip op. at 2 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso July 29, 1981, no writ) (unreported) (appellant
applied for transcript and received affidavit from court reporter that no record made); Muldoon v. Musgrave, 545 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ) (appellant requested preparation of fact statement and obtained court reporter's affidavit that he
could not prepare one); Morgan Express, Inc. v. Elizabeth-Perkins, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 312, 316
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ refd) (court reporter "certified" that stenographic record
unavailable).
156. Garcia v. Kelly, 565 S.W.2d 112, 113 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no
writ); Burrows v. Bowden, 564 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no
writ). In Walker v. O'Rear, 472 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ refd n.r.e.),
appellee obtained the affidavit of the trial judge that, if requested, he would have prepared a
statement of facts. The court held that "it places an unfair burden upon Appellant to have
to rely on the trial court for his statement of facts." Id at 791; accord Pacific Greyhound
Lines, Inc. v. Burgess, 118 S.W.2d 1100, 1103 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1938, writ ref d).
157. Gaffney v. Cielo Vista Bank, No. 7019, slip op. at 2 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso July
29, 1981, no writ) (unreported); Gilbert v. Singleton, 611 S.W.2d 163, 164-65 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1981, no writ); Burrows v. Bowden, 564 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1978, no writ); Muldoon v. Musgrave, 545 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
158. TEX. R. CIv. P. 377; Smith v. Sun-Belt Aviation, Ltd., 625 S.W.2d 22, 22 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1981, writ dism'd) (letter requesting preparation of statement of facts
with court reporter's notation that no stenographic record made); Gaffney v. Cielo Vista
Bank, No. 7019, slip op. at 2 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso July 29, 1981, no writ) (unreported)
(application for preparation of transcript included request for preparation of statement of
facts).
159. Smith v. Sun-Belt Aviation, Ltd., 625 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1981,
writ dism'd).
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The authors recommend that the defendant document the unavailability of
a statement of facts in question and answer form by making and filing of
record a proper request accompanied by an affidavit of unavailability from
either the court reporter or the trial judge. Otherwise, the appellate court
may presume there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court
0
judgment.16
B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
In nonjury trials the defaulting defendant is generally entitled to a record of the trial judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law, in addition
to the stenographic record.1 6 1 In Calhoun v. Calhoun, 162 however, the defendant's request for such a record was refused. In that case the appellant
stated that he timely filed his request for findings of fact and conclusions of
law and alleged that the trial court erred in failing to honor such request.
The appellate court held that "the record available to us affirmatively
shows that appellant was not prejudiced by the trial court's failure to file
findings of fact and conclusions of law."' 163 SouthlandMower Co. v. Jordan 164 involved a default judgment damages hearing at which no court
reporter was present. Although no stenographic record of the proceedings
was made, the trial court made extensive findings of fact and conclusions
of law in its judgment. The defendant appealed, claiming that the unavailability of a statement of facts entitled him to reversal of the judgment. The
plaintiff contended that extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law
by the trial court obviated the need for a statement of facts in question and
answer form. The court of civil appeals rejected the plaintiff's contention
and reversed the award of damages, but affirmed the finding of liability. 165
V.

A.
1

POST-JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS

Setting Aside a Judgment by Default

Mechanics of Setting Aside a Judgment by Default

A judgment by default becomes final at the expiration of thirty days. 166
Within that time, the defendant may file a motion for a new trial. 167 If this
motion is overruled, the defendant may move to set aside the default judgment entered against him, so long as his motion is disposed of before the
160. See Brunson v. Pittman & Harris, 640 S.W.2d 91, 92 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982,
no writ).
161. TEX. R. Civ. P. 296; 6 W. DORSANEO, supra note 80, § 141.100[1].
162. 617 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
163. Id. at 758.
164. 587 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).

165. Id at 217.
166. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b; Thursby v. Stovall, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 308 (Apr. 8, 1983);
Broussard v. Dunn, 568 S.W.2d 126, 127 (Tex. 1978); Canavati v. Shipman, 610 S.W.2d 200,
202 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ); 6 W. DORSANEO, supra note 80, § 140.03;
4 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, § 18.03.
167. 6 W. DORSANEO, supra note 80, § 140.03; 4 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, ch. 18.
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court loses jurisdiction of the case.1 68 The defendant's motion may be labeled either a motion for new trial, a motion to set aside the default judgment, or both. 169 Once the judgment becomes final, the judgment debtor
may appeal by regular appeal or by writ of error. 70 The filing of a bill of
review is also available to the defaulting defendant.' 7' If the defendant's
motion for a new trial or to set aside the default judgment is granted, the
plaintiff may not appeal since such an order is interlocutory. 72
Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc. 173 established rules for setting
aside default judgments. The Craddock test states that a judgment by default should be set aside if the defendant establishes all' 74 of the following:
(1) that the failure to answer was neither intentional nor the result of conscious indifference, (2) that the failure to answer was due to a mistake or
an accident, (3) that the defendant has a meritorious defense, and (4) that
the defendant's motion was filed at a time when the granting thereof would
occasion no delay or otherwise work an injury to plaintiff. 75 The essential
elements of the Craddock test may be established by affidavit or other
competent evidence. 176 The question of whether the Craddock test is satisfied is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be
77
overturned absent a showing of abuse of discretion.
168.

Broussard v. Dunn, 568 S.W.2d 126, 128 (Tex. 1978); Mesa Agro v. R.C. Dove &

Sons, 584 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); 4 R. MCDONALD, supra note 7, §§ 18.03, 18.06.4.
169. Pohl, supra note il, at 30.
170. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 2249, 2249a (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).

171. Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1979).
172. Flato Bros., Inc. v. McKinney, 399 S.W.2d 957, 957 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1966, no writ).
173. 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.?d 124 (1939).
174. Patton v. Samuel, 262 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1953, writ
dism'd).
175. 134 Tex. at 393, 133 S.W.2d at 126. Although there are considerable differences in
nuance among jurisdictions regarding relief from a default judgment, the prevailing view is
that a judgment by default may be avoided if:
(I) The failure to appear was the result of excusable neglect;
(2) The applicant for relief acted with due diligence in ascertaining that the
judgment had been rendered and with reasonable promptness in seeking relief, and the application was made within the time limitation of an applicable
statute or rule of court; and
(3) The application for relief shows there is a genuine issue upon which the
judgment depends and which should be adjudicated.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 67 (1982).

176. Stark v. Nationwide Fin. Corp., 610 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist
Dist.] 1980, no writ); Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Lyon, 576 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. Civ.

APP.-Texarkana 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Healy v. Wick Bldg. Syss., Inc., 560 S.W.2d 713,
i(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Abercia v. First Nat'l Bank, 500 S.W.2d

573, 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, no writ). If the necessary affidavit is unavailable, a showing should be made in the defendant's moving papers of such unavailability
despite the exercise of due diligence. 4 R. McDONALD, supra note 7, § 18.10.1.
177. Farley v. Clark Equip. Co., 484 S.W.2d 142, 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972,
writ ref d n.r.e.); Young v. Snowcon, Inc., 463 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston

[14th Dist.] 1971, no writ).
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2 Reasonsfor Failureto Timely Answer
The first two elements of the Craddock test require the defendant to
demonstrate that his failure to timely answer was neither intentional nor
the result of conscious indifference but was, instead, due to an accident or
mistake. The defendant's negligence will not preclude the setting aside of
a judgment by default. 78 In fact, the defendant's burden of demonstrating
the accidental or mistaken nature of his failure to answer may often result
in an admission of negligence. The slightest excuse may be sufficient to
warrant setting aside a judgment by default so long as the act or omission
79
causing defendant's failure to answer was in fact accidental.'
No formula for distinguishing excusable accident or mistake from intentional failure or conscious indifference has been articulated by our courts.
An examination of the excuses tendered by defaulting defendants is therefore particularly instructive. A number of different mistakes of fact may
constitute excusable neglect. 180 The misplacing of a file by an attorney,' 8 '
secretary, 82 or insurer 183 have all been held to justify the setting aside of a
default judgment. Similarly, failure to forward process to one's insurance
company before appearance day has been excused when the papers were
misplaced and forgotten.184 The failure of a secretary to notify an attorney
of a trial setting can also constitute excusable neglect. 185 Mistakes of counsel, such as miscalculating the answer date, are generally accepted as valid
excuses for failure to timely answer. 186 An attorney's mistaken belief that
the case would not be called until a later date because of a crowded docket
178. Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. 1966); Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Lyon,
576 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); 4 R. McDONALD,
supra note 7, § 18.10.2.
179. Beard v. McKinney, 456 S.W.2d 451,453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1970,
no writ); Cadena v. Dicker, 383 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1964, no writ).
Gross negligence is not an excuse since it rises to the level of conscious indifference. See
Heath v. Fraley, 50 Tex. 209, 211 (1878); National Mut. Casualty Co. v. Lambert, 149
S.W.2d 1086, 1089 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1941, writ dism'd judgmt cor.).

180. The courts have generally drawn no distinction between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact. Annot., 21 A.L.R.3D 1255, 1262 (1968).

181. Leonard v. Leonard, 512 S.W.2d 771, 773 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974,
writ dism'd).
182. Continental Airlines v. Carter, 499 S.W.2d 673, 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973,

no writ); Republic Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 469 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1971, no writ).
183. Reynolds v. Looney, 389 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965, writ

ref'd n.r.e.).
184. Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. 1972).
185. Kirk v. Farmers Aerial Spraying Serv., Inc., 496 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1973, no writ).
186. Continental Airlines v. Carter, 499 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973,
no writ); Texas Iron & Metal Co. v. Utility Co., 493 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Allison v. American Sur. Co., 248 S.W. 829, 832
(Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston 1923, no writ); see Hickman v. Swain, 210 S.W. 548, 551-52
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1919, no writ); Springer v. Gillespie, 56 S.W. 369, 370 (Tex.
Civ App. 1900, no writ). See generally 1 H. BLACK, supra note 9, § 341 (general discussion
of attorney negligence); Annot., .21 A.L.R.3D 1255, 1264 (1968) (opening judgment claimed

to have been obtained because of attorney mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial, or
filing of necessary papers).
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has prompted the granting of a new trial.' 87 The same result ensued when
counsel thought his request for a continuance had been granted when in
fact it had been lost in the mail.' 88 Similarly, counsel's mailing of defendant's plea of privilege to the wrong county seat has constituted excusable
neglect in certain circumstances. 89 Occasionally, ignorance of the law has
been held sufficient to excuse a defendant's failure to timely answer.' 90
Acts of other persons and unavoidable events sometimes create excusable accidents or mistakes. For example, defendant's failure to answer is
excusable if it resulted from reliance upon certain acts or statements of the
plaintiff,' 9' opposing counsel's fraudulent intent to take unfair advantage
of the defendant, 9 2 or from plaintiffs failure to notify defendant of the
setting of the case for trial. 193 Similarly, a new trial has been granted
where the clerk failed to notify a nonresident attorney of a trial setting
after having been instructed to do so.' 94 A motion for new trial should
also be granted on a showing that the suit had apparently been settled
196
prior to the entry of judgment. 95 Unexpected transportation failures
197
and counsel's being lost on unfamiliar roads have been held sufficient
excuses. The absence of the defendant or his attorney due to illness 19 8 or
187. Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Tomkies, 66 S.W. 1109, 1110 (Tex. Civ. App.
1902, no writ).
188. Yellow Transit Co. v. Klaff, 145 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1940,
no writ).
189. Borger v. Mineral Wells Clay Prods. Co., 80 S.W.2d 333, 337 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1935, no writ).
190. Dowell v. Winters, 20 Tex. 793, 795 (1858); Continental Airlines v. Carter, 499
S.W.2d 673, 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, no writ); Cadena v. Dicker, 383 S.W.2d 73,
75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1964, no writ). Contra Pierce v. Cole, 17 Tex. 259, 261 (1856); 1
H. BLACK, supra note 9, §§ 335, 341; Annot., 21 A.L.R.3D 1255, 1262 (1968).
191. Field & Co. v. Fowler, 62 Tex. 65, 69 (1884); Interstate Minerals, Inc. v. Schlumberger Well Survey Corp., 219 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1949, no writ);
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. City of Junction, 55 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1932, no writ); Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Arant, 40 S.W. 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897,
no writ). To be enforceable an agreement must be made in open court, entered of record or
signed by the parties thereto, and filed among the papers of the case. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11; 1
H. BLACK, supra note 9, § 322.
192. See Pearl Assurance Co. v. Williams, 167 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1942, no writ) (appeal from judgment sustaining special exceptions to bill of review
petition); Meckel v. State Bank, 256 S.W. 668, 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1923, no
writ).
193. Torres v. Casso-Guerra & Co., 512 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
194. Browne v. General Elec. Co., 402 S.W.2d 957, 958-59 (Tex. Civ. App-San
Antonio 1966, writ dism'd); Vela v. Sharp, 395 S.W.2d 66, 67 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (failure of clerk to comply with TEX. R. Civ. P. 246).
195. Sedberry v. Jones, 42 Tex. 10, 11-12 (1875); Chaney v. Allen, 25 S.W.2d 1115, 1116
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1930, no writ). But see Ladd v. Coleman, 285 S.W. 1096, 1098-99
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1926, no writ); Southwestern Sur. Ins. Co. v. Gulf, T. & W.
Ry., 196 S.W. 276, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1917, writ refd).
196. Thomas v. Womack, 13 Tex. 580, 585-86 (1855) (defendant delayed by illness of his
horse); Pecos & N.T. Ry. v. Faulkner, 118 S.W. 747, 749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ)
(change in train schedule).
197. Presidio Cotton Gin & Oil Co. v. Dupuy, 2 S.W.2d 341, 342-43 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1928, no writ).
198. Goodhue v. J. Meyers & Co., 58 Tex. 405, 406 (1883); Berhns v. Harris, 150 S.W.
495, 495-96 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1912, no writ); Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Jen-
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compulsory attendance in another court' 99 ordinarily is held sufficient excuse. Moreover, an illness in the family of the defendant's attorney may
constitute excusable neglect, 200 but in this situation the court may require
that the defendant demonstrate the exercise of due diligence in seeking the
20
employment of other counsel. '
Failure to timely answer has been held intentional or due to conscious
indifference in various situations. Fraudulent actions of one's counsel excuse a defendant's failure to answer only when those acts rise to the level
of deceit or betrayal. 20 2 Failure to answer because of confusion in coun2 4
sel's office 20 3 or because of negligent failure of counsel to file an answer 0
have both been held not to require the granting of a new trial. A defendant's mistaken belief that counsel had been retained may not excuse a failure to timely answer. 20 5 The assumption that the defendant's insurer
probably already had notice of the suit also does not justify a failure to
timely answer. 2°6 The defendant's failure to answer under the mistaken
belief that he would be notified later of a court date is inexcusable. 20 7 Renings, 51 S.W. 288, 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ); Holliman v. Pearlstone, 29 S.W. 542,
542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no writ).
199. Tullis v. Scott, 38 Tex. 537, 541-42 (1873); Farmers' Gas Co. v. Calame, 262 S.W.
546, 549-50 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1924, no writ). But see Murray v. Dahlem, 524 S.W.2d
409, 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no writ).
200. Walker v. Harris, 227 S.W. 360, 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1921, no writ);
Howard v. Emerson, 59 S.W. 49, 50 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, no writ).
201. Southwestern Sur. Ins. Co. v. Gulf, T. & W. Ry., 196 S.W. 276, 278 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1917, writ ref'd); see Homuth v. Williams, 42 S.W.2d 1048, 1049 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1931, no writ).
202. Caldwell Oil Co. v. Hickman, 270 S.W. 214, 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1925, no
writ); see Sandoval v. Rattikin, 395 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1965,
writ refd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 901 (1966). See generally I H. BLACK, supra note 9,
§ 344 (fraud of attorney).
203. Brothers Dept. Store, Inc. v. Berenzweig, 333 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1960, writ refd n.r.e.); Dempsey v. Gibson, 100 S.W.2d 430, 32 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1936, no writ).
204. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Earnest, 293 S.W. 677, 681 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo), aff'd, 116 Tex. 565, 296 S.W. 1088 (1927); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Skinner, 128
S.W. 715, 717 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ refd). Contra Beard v. McKinney, 456 S.W.2d 451,
454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1970, no writ) (abuse of discretion to refuse new
trial when default resulted from "breakdown of procedure" in appellant's attorney's office).
205. Scrivner v. Malone, 30 Tex. 773, 775 (1868); Tarrant County v. Lively, 25 Tex. 399,
403-04 (Supp. 1860); Justice Life Ins. Co. v. Walker, 508 S.W.2d 434, 436-37 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ refd n.r.e.); Allais v. Lynch, 489 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston rlst Dist.] 1972, writ refd n.r.e.); Brothers Dept. Store, Inc. v. Berenzqeig,
333 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, writ refd n.r.e.); Homuth v. Williams, 42 S.W.2d 1048, 1049 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1931, no writ); Shipp v. Anderson, 173
S.W. 598, 599 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1915, no writ); Wilson v. Smith, 43 S.W. 1086,
1089 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, writ dism'd).
An attorney's actions are binding on his client. Gracy v. West, 422 S.W.2d 913, 918 (Tex.
1968); Swearingen v. Swearingen, 487 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972,
writ dism'd); Sandoval v. Rattikin, 395 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 385 U.s. 901 (1966). In these situations a defendant's
recourse is against his attorney. Scrivner v. Malone, 30 Tex. 773, 775 (1868).
206. Folsom Invs. v. Troutz, 632 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth, 1982, writ
refd n.r.e.).
207. Butler v. Dal Tex Mach. & Tool Co., 627 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1982, no writ).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

fusal to answer on the mistaken belief that the litigation is stayed by either
a prior pleading, 208 a proceeding in another forum, 20 9 or an agreement
with opposing counsel 2 10 does not constitute excusable neglect. Failure to
answer after filing a plea to add a party, coupled with reliance on the custom that no judgment would be entered until the plea was disposed of, will
also not be excused. 2 1' A defendant's failure to appear because of conflicting business commitments is inexcusable. 21 2 Further, it is not error to
deny a new trial in a case where counsel deliberately refused to attend trial
and his clients secreted themselves. 21 3 Absent an attempt to obtain a continuance, failure to answer due to counsel's belief that the case would be
passed after he had informed the clerk of a conflicting engagement is inexcusable. 21 4 Moreover, an unexplained delay by a nonresident in obtaining
Texas counsel has constituted conscious indifference even though the defendant wrote to the judge asking for additional time to hire a Texas attorney. 2 15 Failure to answer due to illness of the defendant has been held
inexcusable where he either had an active business manager who could
have answered, 21 6 or had sufficient time to answer but simply failed to take
the necessary steps. 21 7 Denial of a motion for new trial is not an abuse of
discretion when the defendant has been advised on more than one occasion by opposing counsel that he was in default by virtue of his failure to
answer and has received actual notice of the trial setting. 2 18 The same is
true when defendant, unrepresented by counsel, is admonished by the
court to obtain counsel but fails to do so. 2 19 Further, the mere fact that
negotiations and relations between the parties have been friendly does not
justify the220defendant's belief that plaintiff would not take a default
judgment.
208. Ladd v. Coleman, 285 S.W. 1096, 1099 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1926, no
writ).
209. Graham v. San Antonio Mach. & Supply Corp., 418 S.W.2d 303, 307 (Tex. Civ.
App.--San Antonio 1967, writ refd n.r.e); Simpson v. Glenn, 103 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1937, no writ); Dempsey v. Gibson, 100 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1936, no writ).
210. O'Brien v. Cole, 532 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ); Padgitt v. Evans, 51 S.W. 513, 514 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ).
211. Gillaspie v. City of Huntsville, 151 S.W. 1114, 1116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1912, no writ).
212. Landa v. McGehee, 19 S.W. 516, 516 (Tex. 1892) (defendant had "no one to look
after his business or attend to his stock").
213. Strode v. Silverman, 217 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1949, writ refd).
214. Murray v. Dahlem, 524 S.W.2d 409, 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no writ).
215. Vinson v. Triangle Ranch, Inc., 472 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1971, writ refd n.r.e.); see Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Lipscomb, 27 S.W. 307, 308 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1894, no writ).
216. Woytek v. King, 218 S.W. 1081, 1081-82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1920, no writ).
217. Heath v. Fraley, 50 Tex. 209, 211 (1878).
218. Ana-Log, Inc. v. City of Tyler, 520 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975,
writ ref d n.r.e.).
219. Wood v. Zenith Mortgage Co., 538 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1976, writ ref d n.r.e.); Bratcher v. Sherman, 474 S.W.2d 807, 808-09 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1971, no writ).
220. Grammar v. Hobby, 276 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex Civ. App.--San Antonio 1955, writ
ref d n.r.e.).
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The inconsistency of some of the foregoing examples reflects the tendency of the courts to reach acceptable dispositions in individual cases
rather than to follow a consistent rule or theory. Essentially, decisions
with respect to the first two elements of the Craddock test are often based
upon a subjective determination of what is best in a particular case. If the
accident or mistake requirement of the Craddock test is to have substance,
trial courts should set aside default judgments only if convinced that the
defaulting defendant has acted in good faith, that the accident or mistake
by which he seeks to excuse himself was the cause of his default, and that
he could not have protected himself by the exercise of reasonable diligence. 221 The fact of defendant's good faith and the accidental nature of
his failure to answer must be demonstrated by affidavit or other competent
nor unbelievable and interevidence. 22 2 Neither conclusory allegations
223
nally inconsistent excuses will suffice.
3. Meritorious Defense Requirement
The defaulting defendant is required to set up a meritorious defense
when moving to set aside a default judgment. 2 24 A meritorious defense is
one that, if proved, would cause a different result upon a retrial of the
6
case, 225 although it need not be a totally opposite result. 22 To set up a
meritorious defense the defendant must allege facts that constitute a prima
facie defense to the plaintiffs claim. 227 The facts of a meritorious defense
may be set forth by affidavit or other competent evidence. 228 The factual
basis of defendant's meritorious defense must be stated in considerable de1 A. FREEMAN, supra note 9, § 242.
222. Stark v. Nationwide Fin. Corp., 610 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1980, no writ); Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Lyon, 576 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); Healy v. Wick Bldg. Sys. Inc., 560 S.W.2d 713, 721
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, no writ).
223. Folsom Invs. v. Troutz, 632 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
224. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 392, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126
(1939).
225. Holliday v. Holliday, 72 Tex. 581, 585, 10 S.W. 690, 692 (1889); Cragin v. Henderson County Oil Dev. Co., 280 S.W. 554, 555 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, holding approved);
Farley v. Clark Equip. Co., 484 S.W.2d 142, 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, writ refd
n.r.e.); Sanns v. Chapman, 144 S.W.2d 341, 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1940, writ
dism'd judgmt cor.).
226. Folsom Invs., Inc. v. Troutz, 632 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982,
writ refd n.r.e.). For example, a lesser amount of damages would be a different result. Id.
227. Magana v. Magana, 576 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no
writ); Hatton v. Gonzalez, 541 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no
writ); Pierson v. McClanahan, 531 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref d
n.r.e.); Boatright v. Peterson, 490 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ refd
n.r.e.); United Equitable Ins. Co. v. Sonnier, 428 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968, no writ).
228. Ivy v. Carrel, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966); Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Lyon,
576 S.W.2d 114, 116-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); Magana v.
Magana, 576 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ); Muenster
Mfg. Co. v. Muenster Indus. Found., 426 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1968, no writ); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Earnest, 293 S.W. 677, 686 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo), aff'd in partper curiam, 116 Tex. 565, 296 S.W. 1088 (1927).
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tail and clarity 229 and may not be controverted. 230 The defendant's burden of setting up a meritorious defense is much like that of one who
opposes a motion for summary judgment, 23 1 because the trial court, in ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment, is confined to a determination of whether there is a fact issue to be tried. 232 The fact that the
defendant successfully sets up a meritorious defense for purposes of setting
aside a default judgment is not dispositive upon retrial of the case. 233
Although the factual basis of defendant's meritorious defense may not
be controverted, the legal sufficiency of the facts may be challenged. 2 34
Thus, the defendant must disclose his defenses with sufficient particularity
to enable the court to determine whether they are good and sufficient on
the merits. 235 This requirement serves to prevent the reopening of cases to
229. See Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214-15 (Tex. 1966); Magana v. Magana, 576
S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ); Dallas Heating Co. v.
Pardee, 561 S.W.2d 16, 20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r.e.); Bredeson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 110, 113 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974,
no writ); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Earnest, 293 S.W. 677, 686 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo), af'd inpartpercuriam, 116 Tex. 565, 296 S.W. 1088 (1927). The court in Earnest
stated:
Specific facts rather than conclusions must be stated. If the facts are not
within the personal knowledge of the affiant, the names and residences of the
witnesses by whom he expects to prove them should be set out, and, if practicable, the affidavits of the witnesses, setting out the facts to which they will
testify, should accompany the motion or good reason shown why such affidavits could not be procured. It must also reasonably appear that the proof of
these facts will be made upon another trial, and it should reasonably appear
that they are true, and that the affiant believes them to be true.
293 S.W. at 686-87.
230. Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966); Cragin v. Henderson County Oil
Dev. Co., 280 S.W. 554, 557 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, holding approved); Russell v. Northeast Bank, 527 S.W.2d 783, 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Farley v. Clark Equip. Co., 484 S.W.2d 142, 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, writ refd
n.r.e.).
231. Burns v. Burns, 568 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ refd
n.r.e.); Hagans & Pohl, supra note 117, at 27-28. See generally Hittner, Summary Judgments
in Texas, 21 S. TEX. L.J. 1, 13-15 (1981) (procedure for responding to motion for summary
judgment); Hittner, Summary Judgments in Texas, 43 TEX. B.J. 11, 16-17 (1980) (guidelines
for opposing summary judgment motions).
232. Cragin v. Henderson County Oil Dev. Co., 280 S.W. 554, 555 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1926, holding approved); Burns v. Burns, 568 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
233. Cragin v. Henderson County Oil Dev. Co., 280 S.W. 554, 556 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1926, holding approved); Hendricks v. Williams, 485 S.W.2d 304, 308 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1972, no writ); Cadena v. Dicker, 383 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1964, no writ).
234. See, e.g., Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Lyon, 576 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (defense that improperly alleged cause of action for negligent misrepresentation not meritorious defense); Russell v. Northeast Bank, 527 S.W.2d 783,
786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ refd n.r.e.) (defense claim of no liability
on note because of novation challenged for failure to establish all necessary elements); Farley v. Clark Equip. Co., 484 S.W.2d 142, 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967, writ refd
n.r.e.) (defense alleged failed to establish all elements of binding contract); see also Cragin v.
Henderson County Oil Dev. Co., 280 S.W. 554, 556 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, holding approved) (facts of meritorious defense must state prima facie defense).
235. 1 A. FREEMAN, supra note 9, § 283; accord Foster v. Martin, 20 Tex. 119, 121-22
(1857).
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try out fictitious or unmeritorious defenses. 2 36
4. Requirement of No Delay or Injury to Plaintiff
A motion to set aside a default judgment must be filed at a time when
the granting thereof would occasion no delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff. To comply with this element of the Craddock test, the defendant must:
(1) file his motion promptly upon learning of the entry of a final default
judgment, 237 (2) offer to reimburse the plaintiff for his expenses in securing
the default judgment, 238 and (3) offer to go to trial. 239 The foregoing requirements are stated conjunctively and are mandatory. 240 They are
designed to prevent prejudice to the plaintiff by keeping him from being
placed in a worse position than that in which he would have been had
defendant timely answered or appeared for trial. 24 ' Once the defendant
has tendered prima facie evidence that the granting of a new trial will not
delay or otherwise injure plaintiff, the burden of going forward with proof
236. Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966).
237. Compare Glittenberg v. Hughes, 524 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1975, no writ) (1 -day delay excessive); Griffin v. Duty, 286 S.W.2d 229, 233 (Tex. Civ.
A p.--Galveston 1956, no writ) (19-day delay excessive); Grammar v. Hobby, 276 S.W.2d
3 f1,313 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (three-day delay excessive);
and Simpson v. Glenn, 103 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937, no writ) (threeweek delay excessive); with Gardner v. Jones, 570 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1978, no writ) (no delay or other injury to plaintiff where motion for new trial
filed eight days after rendition of judgment and hearing thereon held 17 days later); and
Abercia v. First Nat'l Bank, 500 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, no
writ) (seven-day delay would not injure plaintiff).
238. United Beef Producers, Inc. v. Lookingbill, 532 S.W.2d 958, 959 (Tex. 1976); Houston v. Starr, 12 Tex. 424, 425 (1854); Mitchell v. Webb, 591 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ); White v. Douglas, 569 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Bums v. Bums, 568 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1978, writ reed n.r.e.), the court stated:
Expenses not accrued to a plaintiff by the time of the filing of a defendant's
motion for new trial, or not by some change of position to his detriment in the
reliance upon the validity of the judgment prior to the time of the filing of the
motion for new trial, would be improper ....
Id. at 672.
239. Some courts, adopting a literal reading of the "no delay" requirement of Craddock,
have held that defendant must state that he is ready, willing, and able to go to trial immediately. Spencer v. Affleck & Co., 620 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, writ refd n.r.e.); Calhoun v. Calhoun, 617 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Mitchell v. Webb, 591 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1979, no writ). This requirement is of little utility in counties with congested trial
dockets, but can be severe in counties where the docket is current.
240. Spencer v. Affleck & Co., 620 S.W.2d 831, 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.); Calhoun v. Calhoun, 617 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Mitchell v. Webb, 591 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ); White v. Douglas, 569 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); Bums v. Bums, 568 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); Crabbe v. Hord, 536 S.W.2d 409, 413-14 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ refd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 932 (1977).
241. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 391, 133 S.W.2d 124, 125
(1939); Bums v. Bums, 568 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ refd
n.r.e.).
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of injury shifts to the plaintiff.242 The duty of the court is to do substantial
the court can make
justice by balancing the equities, 243 and in that regard,
244
costs.
assessing
in
discretion
its
of
use
judicious
In ruling on a motion for new trial or to set aside a default judgment, the
court must consider the policy favoring finality of judgments. Finality of
judgments is especially important in larger counties with congested trial
dockets. When default judgments are set aside as a matter of course, undue delay often results. Injustice may be done by a trial court's lenient
new trial application policy. Even so, the absence of uniform rules on this
issue in Texas leaves the subjective criteria for setting aside default judgments to the sound discretion of each trial judge.
B. Regular Appeal
A party who has appeared and participated in the trial of a case may
appeal to the court of appeals. Similarly, a regular appeal is available to a
party who has suffered a judgment by default. Orders setting aside judgments by default, however, are not subject to review even after completion
of a trial. Therefore, appellate review is available only if a trial court fails
to set aside a default judgment. The time limits for appeal from a default
judgment are the same as those for any other regular appeal. 245
C.

Writ of ErrorAppeal

The appellate jurisdiction of the courts of appeals and the supreme court
may be invoked by a writ of error.2 46 A proceeding by writ of error constitutes a direct attack upon a default judgment. It brings the entire case
before the appellate court for review and disposition in the same manner
as does a regular appeal. 24 7 A writ of error may also be granted for only a
portion of a case, allowing the remainder of the default judgment to
stand. 248 When a defendant attacks a default judgment by writ of error,
the appellate court will make no presumption of the judgment's validity or
of the validity of service. 24 9 A writ of error is a proper avenue by which to
242. Burns v. Burns, 568 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
243. United Beef Producers, Inc. v. Lookingbill, 532 S.W.2d 958, 959 (Tex. 1976).
244. Id.
245. City of Wichita Falls v. Dye, 517 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rector v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 506 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Warren v. Walter, 409 S.W.2d 887, 887
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966), writ refd n.r.e.per curiam, 414 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. 1967).
246. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 2249, 2249a (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
247. Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. 1965); Roe v. Doe, 607 S.W.2d 602,
603 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ); Light v. Verrips, 580 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ); Spears v. Brown, 567 S.W.2d 544, 545 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.); Curry Motor Freight, Inc. v. Ralston Purina
Co., 565 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
248. See Nettles v. Del Lingco, 638 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ) (writ
of error granted on issue of unliquidated attorney's fees but remainder of judgment, based
on written contract, affirmed).
249. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965); Zarogoza v. De La Paz
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appeal a default judgment if (1) the petition for writ of error is filed within
six months after the final judgment is rendered, 250 (2) the petition is filed
by a party to the suit,2 5 1 (3) the writ is filed by a nonparticipant in the
trial, 252 and (4) the error is apparent on the face of the record.2 53 An understanding of the above elements is essential to the successful appeal of a
default judgment by writ of error.
The statutory six-month period in which a writ of error must be filed
254
begins to run when the judgment is declared final by the trial court.
The filing of a motion for new trial is not a prerequisite to pursuit of a writ
of error. 255 The petition for writ of error must state the names and residences of all parties who are adversely interested in the suit. 256 Texas
courts have defined "parties adversely interested" to include not only parties whose interests in the proceeding are adverse to that of the party seeking the writ of error, but also parties whose interests may be affected by the
modification or reversal of the judgment in question. 25 7 Omission from
the petition of the names and residences of all such parties is fatal to the
writ of error because the jurisdiction of the court of appeals will not be
invoked. 258 In Byrd v. AlliedAmerican Bank 25 9 the appellant attacked by
writ of error a default judgment that led to the sale of appellant's property.
The petition for writ of error did not include the name and address of the
person who purchased the property. The court dismissed the writ of error
for want of jurisdiction, holding that the purchaser of the property was a
party adversely interested because260a reversal of the default judgment
would render the sale to him void.
The prohibition against one who participated in the actual trial of the
case bringing a writ of error is purely statutory. 26 1 Although the extent of
participation in the trial that disqualifies an appellant from review by writ
Morales, 616 S.W.2d 295, 295-96 (rex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hagans
& Pohl, supra note 117, at 17.
250. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2255 (Vernon 1971).

251. Brown v. McLennan County Children's Protective Servs., 627 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex.
1982).
252. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2249a (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
253. Garcia v. Garcia, 618 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no
writ).
254. Linton v. Smith, 154 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1943, opinion adopted).
255. TEX. R. Civ. P. 324; Glenn W. Casey Constr., Inc. v. Citizen's Nat'l Bank, 611
S.W.2d 695, 700 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ); Winston Mortgage Co. v. Bevly, 583
S.W.2d 838, 839 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Griffin v.
Browne, 482 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, writ ref d n.r.e.).
256. TEX. R. Civ. P. 360.
257. Hackfield v. Ryburn, 606 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ);
Ponca Wholesale Mercantile Co. v. Alley, 378 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
258. Byrd v. Allied Am. Bank, 590 S.W.2d 835, 836-37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1979, no writ); Thomas v. Iliff, 524 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975,
no writ).
259. 590 S.W.2d 835 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
260. Id at 837.
261. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2249a (Vernon 1971).
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of error has been said to be one of degree, 262 courts have held that one who
263
merely files an answer and does nothing more has not participated.
Neither has one participated when he files a motion for new trial but does
not take part in the hearing on the motion.264 A defendant who has not
been served, however, but who testifies at trial on behalf of another defendant, is considered to have participated in the trial. 265 Participation has
also been found where a party files a response to his opponent's motion for
summary judgment. 266 The Texas Supreme Court offered guidance to the
practitioner on the issue of participation in its opinion in Lawyers Lloyds v.
Webb .267 The court stated:
The statute was intended to cut off the right of appeal by writ of error
of those who participate in the hearing in open court in the trial that
leads to final judgment. It was not intended to cut off the right of
those who discover that a judgment has been rendered against them
after the judgment has been rendered,
and who participate only to the
268
extent of seeking a new trial.
The final element necessary to appeal by writ of error requires that the
error be apparent on the face of the record. 269 This element has been
described as the decisive question in the granting of a writ of error 270 because an error not exhibited by the record cannot be corrected by the appellate court. 2 7' Courts of appeals have held that the error in the trial
court's judgment must be disclosed by the papers on file in the case. 2 72 In
Gourmet, Inc. v. Hurley273 the court interpreted the term "face of the record" to include only the judgment and filed papers, both of which would
be included in the transcript on appeal, and not the evidence introduced at
a hearing, which would be included in the statement of facts. 274 Although
the error must appear in the papers on file in the case, the appellate court
examines such papers very closely. The case of Glenn W. Casey Construction v. Citizens National Bank 275 is illustrative. In that case the garnishee
appealed a judgment in favor of the garnishor by means of writ of error.
262. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 572 S.W.2d 807, 807-08 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1978, no writ).
263. Petroleum Casualty Co. v. Garrison, 174 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
264. Lawyers Lloyds v. Webb, 137 Tex. 107, 111, 152 S.W.2d 1096, 1098 (1941).
265. Mata v. Ruiz, 640 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
266. Bevan v. Zarges, 645 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ).
267. 137 Tex. 107, 152 S.W.2d 1096 (1941).
268. Id at 110-11, 152 S.W.2d at 1097-98.
269. Garcia v. Garcia, 618 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no
writ).
270. Light v. Verrips, 580 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1979, no
writ).
271. Garcia v. Garcia, 618 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no
writ).
272. Glenn W. Casey Constr., Inc. v. Citizen's Nat'l Bank, 611 S.W.2d 695, 700 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ); Winston Mortgage Co. v. Bevly, 583 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
273. 552 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
274. Id at 512-13.
275. 611 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ).
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1983]

The appellee contended that only by comparing the judgment appealed
from with the default judgment in a garnishment case, a separately docketed and numbered cause not then before the court, could a defect be discovered. This, insisted the appellee, was not an error apparent on the face
of the record. The court agreed that the invalidity of the judgment must
be disclosed by the papers on file in the case, but added that since this was
a writ of error the whole case was presented for revision of errors just as on
a direct appeal. 276 The court then noted that the papers on file in the case
contained a full transcript of the proceedings below that included the dates
of the prior proceedings. The court compared the date of the judgment in
the garnishment proceeding with the proceedings on the underlying debt
and noted that the garnishment judgment was rendered prior to any judgment on the underlying debt. 277 The court reversed the lower court's deci-

sion, stating that it was error to render a judgment by default in a
garnishment
proceeding before there was a judgment on the underlying
278
debt.

The statement in the Casey opinion that a writ of error places the whole
case before the court for review is supported by Roe v. Doe,279 a child
custody case. In that case the mother was appointed managing conservator of the child when divorce was granted. Six years later the father filed a
motion to modify. A default judgment was rendered in favor of the father,
and the mother appealed by writ of error. The father, contended that the
court's scope of review was limited to the papers on file in the case, and
280
therefore the court could not consider the mother's evidentiary points.

The court stated, however, that writ of error is but another mode of appeal
that performs the same function as an appeal, and that an appellate court
can test the validity of a judgment by reference to the entire file on the
case, including the statement of facts. 281 The court then proceeded to review the transcript of the case in order to determine if the statutory requirements necessary to a valid judgment had been met.
As a general rule, no evidence is required to support a default judgment. 282 For that reason, frequently no statement of facts or evidence will

be available for the court to review on writ of error. 28 3 The absence of a
statement of facts therefore will not compel reversal unless a claim of unliquidated damages is involved because proof to support a default judg28 4
ment is required only with respect to such damages.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id at 700.

Id

Id.
607 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ).

280. Id at 602-03.
281. Id at 603.
282. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
283. Watson v. Sheppard Fed. Credit Union, 589 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
284. Id at 744; Gourmet, Inc. v. Hurley, 552 S.W.2d 509, 513 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1977, no writ); Morgan Express, Inc. v. Elizabeth-Perkins, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ refd).
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Bill of Review

Once a default judgment has become final, and the time for regular appeal or writ of error has elapsed, the exclusive method of direct attack on
the judgment is by bill of review.28 5 A bill of review is available for four
years after the date of entry of the judgment and is basically an equitable
remedy.2 86 Courts generally emphasize the importance of finality of judgments in our legal system and therefore the grounds justifying the grant of
a bill of review have been very narrowly defined. To be granted a bill of
review, a party must establish that (1) the plaintiff in the bill of review has
suffered a default judgment in some prior court action (the plaintiff in the
bill of review is the defendant in the default case); (2) the plaintiff has a
meritorious defense in the cause of action alleged against him in the former suit; (3) the plaintiff was not served with citation or was prevented
from interposing his defense by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the
adversary or by erroneous information given by an officer of the court acting in his official capacity in the discharge of a duty imposed by law, and
not through any fault or negligence of his own; and (4) that the plaintiff
has exhausted his legal remedies of motion for new trial, appeal, and writ
of error or did not learn of the default
judgment within the time prescribed
28 7
for using such legal remedies.
The bill of review is a new suit under a new docket number. It is usually
instituted as an original proceeding although it may be brought as a crossaction or defense in a suit by the successful parties seeking to enforce the
original judgment. In some of the larger multi-district counties local rules
require bills of review to be filed in the same court in which the original
default judgment was taken. In such counties a number of years may pass
before a trial date is set since bills of review are usually given no preference and are placed on the general trial docket.
Bills of review, as remedies, are looked upon with caution by the appellate courts, and the pleading and proof requirements for them are strictly
enforced. 288 The granting of a new trial by bill of review is generally sub2 89
ject to requirements similar to those of Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines.
The granting of a bill of review has been held improper where the defendant in the original suit failed to allege and establish that no injury would
result to the plaintiff from the granting of the bill of review and that his
285. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b; National Bedding Co. v. McGee, 153 Tex. 55, 56, 263 S.W.2d
948, 949 (1954); Cocke v. Cocke, 382 S.W.2d 789, 790 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1964, no writ).
286. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958).
287. Petro-Chemical Transp., Inc. v. Carroll, 514 S.W.2d 240, 243-45 (Tex. 1974); Texas
Mach. & Equip. Co. v. Gordon Knox Oil & Exploration Co., 442 S.W.2d 315, 317-18 (Tex.
1969); see Texas Indus., Inc. v. Sanchez, 525 S.W.2d 870, 871 (Tex. 1975) (per curiam); see
also Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 568-69, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (1950) (requirements for granting bill of review in order to set aside final judgment).
288. Woodward v. Hopperstad Builders, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 726, 729 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
289. See Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 134 Tex. 388, 393, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (1939);
Parker v. Grant, 568 S.W.2d 163, 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); supra
note 175 and accompanying text.
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failure to answer the original action was not intentional or the result of
conscious indifference. 290 The requirement of a meritorious defense is
much more onerous for a bill of review than for a motion for a new
trial. 29' The judgment debtor must prove his defense, as opposed to merely
stating the factual basis of such defense. 292 In effect, therefore, the bill of
review action is a trial on the merits of the case combined with the additional requirements discussed above. Unless a plaintiff can prove all the
elements of his original defense he will be denied the equitable relief
prayed for. A prima facie defense is established when the court determines
that the defense is not barred as a matter of law and that the plaintiff will
be entitled to judgment in a new trial if no evidence to the contrary is
offered. The existence of a meritorious defense need not be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence. 293 The plaintiff in a bill of review action
must also specifically prove the absence of his fault or negligence in permitting the meritorious defense to go unasserted in the prior action. 29 4 A
lack of diligence or negligence on the plaintiffs part will cause denial of
relief by bill of review. 295 In addition, the Texas Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed its prior holding that a defendant who has an available
appeal but fails to pursue that remedy is not entitled to relief by bill of
296
review.
Extrinsic fraud perpetrated on a defendant by a plaintiff may result in a
default judgment's being set aside by a bill of review. 297 Extrinsic fraud
occurs when one party prevents his opponent from having a fair opportunity to be heard on the merits.298 Purposefully misleading the opposing
party constitutes extrinsic fraud. 299 In contrast, intrinsic fraud is not a sufficient ground for granting a bill of review. Intrinsic fraud pertains to matters actually presented to the trial court and considered by it in rendering
the judgment. 3°° Therefore, false testimony and fraudulent instruments
will not suffice as grounds for the bill of review procedure. 30 '
E. Effect of a Void Judgment
A judgment, by default or otherwise, is void when rendered by a court
290. Parker v. Gant, 568 S.W.2d 163, 165-66 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
291. Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. 1972).
292. Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966); Anderson v. Coker, 364 S.W.2d 481,
482 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see supra notes 227-33 and accompanying text (discussing meritorious defense requirement in motions for new trial). See generally Annot., 174 A.L.R. 10 (1948) (discussing scope and character of meritorious defense).
293. Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 408 (Tex. 1979).
294. Northcutt v. Jarrett, 585 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ refd
n.r.e. per curiam, 592 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. 1979).
295. Kanter v. Herald Publishing Co., 645 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no
writ).
296. Rizk v. Mayad, 603 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1980).
297. Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 574-75, 226 S.W.2d 996, 1001-02 (1950).
298. Id
299. Id
300. Id
301. Id
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that does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, or
that lacks the power to enter the relief granted. 302 Mere technical defects
will not void a judgment. A judgment is absolutely void only if a defect
sufficient to void the judgment appears affirmatively on the face of the
record. 30 3 A judgment that does not reveal such defect on its face or in the
record, and therefore appears valid, is voidable if it is in fact erroneous or
irregular. 3 4 In other words a judgment that appears to be valid, but in
fact is erroneous, is voidable, but not void.
Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is obtained by his voluntary
appearance, by service of citation in accordance with law, or by his acceptance of process or waiver thereof.30 5 As previously discussed, strict compliance with procedural rules regarding service of process is required in
order to bring a defendant properly under the court's jurisdiction, 30 6 and
failure to comply strictly will void a judgment subsequently rendered. 30 7
If the record does not show compliance with the procedural requirements
for proper service of process, a default judgment may not stand. 30 8
A void judgment is an absolute nullity and, in the contemplation of the
law, is no judgment at all.3°9 A void judgment has been characterized as
"a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which may be chopped off at any time,
302. Easterline v. Bean, 49 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tex. 1932); Community Investors IX, Ltd. v.
Phillips Plastering Co., 593 S.W.2d 418, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no
writ); Finley v. Howell, 320 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1958, no writ); Nichols v. Wheeler, 304 S.W.2d 229, 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1957, writ refd n.r.e.); I H.
BLACK, supra note 9, § 83.
303. Ramsey v. Morris, 578 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1979,
writ dism'd); Finley v. Howell, 320 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1958, no
writ); Carson v. Taylor, 261 S.W. 824, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1924, no writ).
304. Gehret v. Hetkes, 36 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tex. Comm'n App. 193 1, holding approved);
Imatani v. Marmolejo, 606 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ);
Arenstein v. Jencks, 179 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1944, writ dism'd).
305. Hanover Modular Homes of Taft, Inc. v. Corpus Christi Bank & Trust, 476 S.W.2d
97, 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972, no writ); Hitt v. Bell, 111 S.W.2d 1164, 1164
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937, no writ); Goodman v. Mayer, 105 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1937), rev'don other grounds, 133 Tex. 319, 128 S.W.2d 1156 (1939); Carson v. Taylor, 261 S.W. 824, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1924, no writ).
306. Exposition Apartments Co. v. Barba, 630 S.W.2d 462, 464 (rex. App.-Austin 1982,
no writ); Fleming v. Hernden, 564 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ refd
n.r.e.); Hanover Modular Homes of Taft, Inc. v. Corpus Christi Bank & Trust, 476 S.W.2d
97, 101 (Tex. Civ. App.---Corpus Christi 1972, no writ); I H. BLACK, supra note 9, § 324;
Hagans & Pohl, supra note 117, at 9; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
307. Kern v. Krueger, 626 S.W.2d 143, 144 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ);
Champion v. Kinney, 460 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1970, no writ);
Nichols v. Wheeler, 304 S.W.2d 229, 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1957, writ ref's n.r.e.);
Lamesa Rural High School Dist. v. Speck, 253 S.W.2d 315, 316 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Corpus Christi v. Scruggs, 89 S.W.2d 458, 459-60 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1935, no writ).
308. Crawford v. Brown, 507 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, no
writ); Presidential Life Ins. Co. v. Crooks, 479 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1972, no writ); Lamesa Rural High School Dist. v. Speck, 253 S.W.2d 315, 316 (Tex. Civ.
App.--Eastland 1952, writ refd n.r.e.).
309. Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906, 910 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1965, writ retd
n.r.e.); Maxwell v. Campbell, 282 S.W.2d 957, 958-59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1955, writ
refd); Hudson v. Nowell & Son, 8 S.W.2d 778, 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1928, no
writ).
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capable of bearing no fruit to plaintiff, but constituting a constant menace
to defendant. '3 10 A court has the inherent power to set aside a void judgment at any time, with or without a motion.3 1' When a default judgment is
void, the movant for a new trial need not comply with the requirements of
the Craddock test. 31 2 In City of Corpus Christi v. Scruggs31 3 the court
stated the following:
The citation and execution thereof being wholly void, plaintiff in
error was not required by law to pay any attention to it, and the judgment based thereon, being likewise wholly void and not only voidable, which is plainly shown on the face of the record herein, it was not
incumbent upon plaintiff in error to show any 3meritorious
defense to
14
the suit, in order to avoid its pretended effect.
In a case decided two years before Craddock, the Commission of Appeals
stated that the requirement of a meritorious defense "should have no apis on the face of the record void or fundaplication when the judgment
' 3 5
mentally erroneous." 1
No writ of execution, order of sale, garnishment, or other process may
issue to enforce a void judgment. 31 6 A judgment creditor who moves to
enforce a void judgment does so at his peril and may be liable for damages
incurred as a result of his wrongful collection efforts. 317 The invalidity of
a void judgment may not be waived. 318 A void judgment has no res judicata effect 3 19 and its defective nature may not be cured in a subsequent
proceeding. 320 It is subject to challenge by both direct and collateral at310. Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008, 1015 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1938,
no writ) (quoting 1 A. FREEMAN, supra note 9,§ 322, at 645).
311. Neugent v. Neugent, 270 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1954, no
writ).
312. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939); see
supra note 175 and accompanying text.
313. 89 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1935, no writ).
314. Id at 460.
315. City of Fort Worth v. Gause, 129 Tex. 25, 29-30, 101 S.W.2d 221, 223 (1937).
316. Stegall v. Huff, 54 Tex. 193, 197 (1881) (judicial sale following void judgment does
not divest owner of title to land); Ridley v. McCallum, 139 Tex. 540, 544, 163 S.W.2d 833,
836 (1942) ("void judgment will not support an execution"); Snell v. Knowles, 87 S.W.2d
871, 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1935, writ dism'd) (sherift's sale held under void judgment does not pass title to purchaser); Underwood v. Brown, 68 S.W. 206, 207 (Tex. Civ.
pp. 1902, no writ) (execution under void judgment is nullity); see Paul v. Willis, 69 Tex.
, 265-66, 7 S.W. 357, 359 (1887) (purchaser at sale cannot acquire title under void administration); Thompson v. Thompson, 238 S.W.2d 218, 220-21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1951,
writ dism'd) (property disposition will not enforce void judgment); Commander v. Bryan,
123 S.W.2d 1008, 1015 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1938, no writ) (void judgment not
made valid by affirmance on appellate review).
317. Comment, Creditor's Liabilityin Texas/or WrongfulAttachment, Garnishment or Execution, 41 TEx. L. REV. 692 (1963).
318. Easterline v. Bean, 121 Tex. 327, 334, 49 S.W. 427, 429 (1932) (void judgment cannot be ratified or confirmed, nor can nullity be waived).
319. Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008, 1015 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1938,
no writ), Ruby v. Davis, 277 S.W. 430, 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarllo 1925, no writ); see
Nichols v. Wheeler, 304 S.W.2d 229, 234 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1957, writ refd n.r.e.).
320. Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1965, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
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tack. 32 1 A voidable judgment, on the other hand, is subject only to direct
attack in accordance with the procedures prescribed by law and is valid
322
and enforceable until set aside.
The distinction between a void judgment and a voidable judgment can
be a crucial one if a litigant attempts to have the judgment set aside directly or collaterally. 323 The traditional rule, which still holds true in
many cases today, provides that a void judgment may be set aside at any
time, even if the attack on the judgment is collateral. 324 A voidable judgment, on the other hand, can be set aside only through direct attack. 3 25
The Texas Supreme Court aptly stated the distinction between the two
types of judgments in Bowers v. Chaney.326 In that case the appellant attempted to collaterally attack a judgment of attachment by claiming that
he was never served with a citation. The land attached had been sold to
one of the defendants. The court stated:
The material question in this case is whether the judgment in the
attachment suit was void for the want of jurisdiction or power in the
court to render it, or was only erroneous. If the former, it can afford
no protection to the purchaser under it; but if the latter, it cannot be
impeached collaterally in this action,
and the purchase of the property
327
sold under it, acquired good title.
Thus, a judgment is void when the court that rendered it lacked the power
to render it because the court did not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the parties. 328 A voidable judgment, by contrast, is a judgment
of a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter or parties that appears to be valid, but that is actually erroneous because of a defect not
329
appearing on the face of the judgment or the record.
A substantial number of the cases that deal with the void/voidable question involve attempts to overturn default judgments. When a default judgment is attacked as being void or voidable, the challenger usually claims
that service of process was deficient in some manner. 330 Litigants should
321. Morris v. Halbert, 36 Tex. 19, 22 (1871); Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906, 910 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1965, writ refd n.r.e.); Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008, 1015
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1938, no writ); see Thompson v. Thompson, 238 S.W.2d 218,
220 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1951, writ dism'd).
322. Tanton v. State Nat'l Bank, 43 S.W.2d 957, 960 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1931),
afd, 125 Tex. 16, 79 S.W.2d 833 (1935); Cariker v. Dill, 140 S.W. 843, 845 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1911, no writ).
323. Bowers v. Chancy, 21 Tex. 363, 368 (1858).
324. Harrison v. Whiteley, 6 S.W.2d 89, 90 (1928).
325. Perry v. Copeland, 323 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1959, writ
dism'd).
326. 21 Tex. 363 (1858).
327. Id at 368.
328. Perry v. Copeland, 323 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1959, writ
dism'd); Finley v. Howell, 320 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1958, no writ);
Woods v. Sloan, 9 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1923), rev'd on other
grounds, 25 S.W.2d 309 (1930).
329. Moore v. Mathis, 369 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
330. Whitney v. L & L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Tex. 1973); McEwen v. Harrison, 345 S.W.2d 706, 707 (Tex. 1961); Texas Inspection Servs., Inc. v. Melville, 616 S.W.2d
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be aware, however, of the dangers of attacking a default judgment by relying on a defect in service of process, even if the defect appears on the face
of the record or judgment. Although some early cases recognized the distinction between void and voidable judgments in suits involving defective
service of process, the distinction is often not addressed. In fact, Texas
courts, in a series of recent decisions, appear to have functionally abolished the distinction between void and voidable judgments when the lack
of jurisdiction is due to some error in service of process. 33 1 When the lack
of jurisdiction is due to a court's lack of power bo hear a certain type of
case, however, the distinction between void and voidable judgments may
still be valid.
In Roberts v. Stockslager, 332 an early Texas case discussing the effect of
invalid service of process on a judgment, the defendant had not been personally served. The court held the judgment "utterly void. ' 333 Cases like
Roberts, in which the courts drew a distinction between void and voidable
judgments, 33 4 have been outnumbered over the years by those cases in
which the distinction was ignored. More importantly, several recent Texas
Supreme Court decisions indicate that, at least when the error complained
of involves a defect in the service of process, there is no distinction between void and voidable judgments. In McEwen v. Harrison335 the party
against whom a default judgment had been entered claimed that the judgment was void because citation had not been served on any person designated as its agent and moved that the judgment be vacated. Although the
party made the motion to vacate thirty days after the entry of the judgment, at which time the court technically no longer had jurisdiction under
rule 329b,3 36 the trial court vacated the judgment as void. The party opposing the motion sought a writ of mandamus from the supreme court
directing the trial court judge to reinstate the default judgment. The Texas
Supreme Court relied on rule 329b and granted the writ of mandamus
without inquiring into the validity of the service of citation or determining
337
whether the alleged defect made the judgment void or merely voidable.
The court held that rule 329b provides the exclusive method of attacking a
judgment when the time for filing a motion for new trial has expired and
therefore relief may not be afforded by appeal. 338 Rule 329b controls even
though a default judgment is asserted to be void for want of service or for
253, 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1981, no writ); Perry v. Copeland, 323 S.W.2d
339, 342-43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1959, writ dism'd); Lamesa Rural High School
Dist. v Speck, 253 S.W.2d315, 316-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, writ refd n.r.e.).
331. See infra notes 338-46 and accompanying text.
332. 4 Tex. 307 (1849).
333. Id at 309. Interestingly, the court refused to determine if the judgment was void
because "the question, which was made in this proceeding, was in relation to the erroneousness, not the invalidity of the judgment." Id
334. See Harrison v. Whitely, 6 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. 1928); Lamesa Rural High School Dist.
v. Speck, 253 S.W.2d 315, 316-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
335. 345 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1961).
336. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
337. 345 S.W.2d at 711.
338. Id
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want of valid service. 339
The Texas Supreme Court followed McEwen in Deen v. Kirk, 34° in
which a divorce judgment was vacated more than thirty days after the rendition of the judgment. Deen, the party requesting that the judgment be
vacated, claimed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over her because
the waiver of citation she had signed was prohibited by statute and constituted a defect apparent on the face of the record. The supreme court
agreed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Deen. 34 1 Nevertheless,
the court held the order vacating the judgment void because a judgment
may be attacked after the expiration of the thirty-day time limit for motion
for new trial only by writ of error or bill of review. 342 The opinion indicates that a judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter will not be treated as void, even though the court clearly lacks
34 3
jurisdiction over one of the parties.
These opinions indicate that litigants should treat all default judgments
entered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter as voidable.
Such judgments should be considered assailable only within the time re34
strictions of rule 329b, by writ of error appeal, or by bill of review.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Judgments by default are important to the effective operation of a system of justice. These judgments promote the prompt resolution of unopposed claims and the removal of such claims from crowded dockets.
Workable rules have been established to guide the bench and the bar in
obtaining and setting aside default judgments. In the opinion of the authors, the existing Texas default judgment law is sound. Application of
existing law will achieve the ends of substantial justice; disregard of existing law will undermine the utility of the default judgment concept.
Practitioners should approach the task of obtaining entry of or setting
aside a default judgment with care. In a similar fashion, courts should
remember that their discretion must be exercised in accordance with established principles of law. When used properly, the default judgment is a
vital part of Texas procedural law.

339. Id
340. 508 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. 1974).

341. Id. at 71.
342. Id at 72.
343. Id; see also Thursby v. Stovall, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 308 (Apr. 9, 1983); Whitney v. L
& L Realty Corp., 520 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1973).

344. See supra notes 285-301 and accompanying text.

